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Megawati takes power with army backing 
On 23 July, Vice President Megawati was installed as Indonesian president after the People's 
Assembly sacked the man it had appointed two years ago. The same state organ that intrigued 
against her then has now promoted her, with the full backing of a regenerated military. Though 
former President Wahid fought to the bitter end, the odds were stacked against him: mutiny by the 
armed forces and large sections of the police who openly defied his orders, a huge majority in the 
People's Assembly bent on ousting him and a largely hostile press. 
While Megawati Sukamoputri's party, the PDI-P, holds the 
largest block of seats in the People's Assembly, the MPR, 
and has mass support in the country, her assumption of 
power bodes ill for the principles of reformasi that were 
supposed to have been at the core ofWahid's policy. 
Most will agree that it was not realistic to expect anyone 
to carry out a comprehensive pro-reform policy in 
Indonesia in the short term, having inherited a country 
damaged almost beyond repair by 40 years of autocratic 
rule and a paralysed economy. In hindsight, it could be said 
that Gus Dur, as Wahid is known, was bound to fail. Will 
Megawati Sukamoputri do any better? Will she face the 
array of foes who were determined from the word 'go' to 
stab Gus Dur in the back? Only time will tell. 
But Indonesia's present political crisis is not merely a 
crisis of the presidency. The deep economic crisis, the 
absence of the rule of law and the lack of democratic insti-
tutions cannot be blamed on the president. These are the 
results of a long term strategy during the 'New Order', when 
the population lived in a perpetual state of fear. Virtually 
nothing has been done in the three post-Suharto years to 
change all this. 
A huge power vacuum 
As the new regime takes over, it is salutary to examine why 
Gus Dur failed to function effectively as president and 
promote the policies expected of him by civil society. As 
soon as he tried to dismantle the power base of the old 
forces, they rallied against him, sabotaging his every move. 
The irony is that, under the authoritarian 1945 Constitution, 
the president of Indonesia has enough powers to become a 
dictator, but Gus Dur was not given the chance even to 
implement a modest reform programme. Isolated and 
maligned by the very political elite who catapulted him into 
power, he become a pathetic figure, hoping against hope 
that his huge religious following could rescue him, while 
being afraid to bring them out onto the streets for fear of 
clashes and bloodshed. For many months, 
In the closing months of Gus Dur's presidency, there was a 
power vacuum in Indonesia, while regional conflicts and 
military crackdowns in many places continued unabated. 
The fact is that none of the political forces in Indonesia has 
been able to cope with the debilitating crisis. The old New 
Order gang, with massive resources stashed away and a bevy 
of supporters, has been mortally wounded. At the apex is 
Suharto and his cronies and family; they have lost much of 
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their political clout and no one believes for a moment that 
they will ever make a comeback. But their staggering wealth 
is being used by sinister forces to finance covert and overt 
operations to sabotage the government and create instability. 
They have done everything possible, often by acts of terror-
ism, to frustrate efforts to bring about change and account-
ability. Their basic aim is to retain the system of privileges 
that was one of the hallmarks of the former regime. 
The army has once again become a formidable political 
force and a killing machine, dedicated as always to the 'secu-
rity' approach, but it 
too is incapable of 
coping with the present 
cns1s. The 1997 
economic meltdown 
also delivered a severe 
blow to the TNI as the 
armed forces are 
known, forcing many 
TNI companies to close 
shop. In compensation, 
the TNI has become 
mired even deeper into 
mafia type activities in 
' 1 the regions. The esca-
lating conflicts in Aceh 
and West Papua and ongoing problems in Maluku, 
Kalimantan and Sulawesi have overwhelmed the capacity of 
the security forces, even though they are themselves largely 
responsible for the mayhem. Troops have joined forces with 
the warring parties in some of these local conflicts, but as the 
power struggle in Jakarta reached a climax, the TNI top 
focused their attention increasingly on these events. Whilst it 
was not predicted that the army would try to grab power, 
Indonesia's rudderless government suited them admirably. 
They have recently been claiming to be 'force for peace' as 
civilian politicians fight it out in total disregard for the ailing 
economy and lawlessness everywhere. 
The vast majority of parliamentarians in the DPR 
(Parliament) and the MPR (People's Assembly), were united 
in their determination to get rid of Gus Dur but apart from 
that, each of the parties have their own political agendas. 
Golkar, the former ruling party, is a shadow of its former 
self in Java, where they are despised as part of the old 
regime. But outside Java, the party is more or less intact, 
with its people occupying virtually all the positions of 
power, from governors and district chiefs down to village 
heads. The bureaucracy outside Java is still a Golkar strong-
hold which explains why it was more interested in keeping 
control of regional spoils than in the power struggle in 
Jakarta. 
The politics of Islam are far more complex today than 
during the Suharto era. The first two post-Suharto presidents, 
President Wahid and his predecessor, President Habibie, 
represent the two major streams in Indonesian Islam, the 
urban-based and the more rural-based Islamic communities, 
but they are both secular Muslims. It was once widely 
accepted that political Islam in Indonesia is a majority with a 
minority mentality, but this is no longer true. The top Muslim 
politicians, including Gus Dur, show distinct Machiavellian 
tendencies in their attitude towards state power and having 
tasted the sweetness of power they show the same credentials 
as any average politician on this globe . 
The rift between the pro and anti Gus Dur camp ran largely 
along urban and rural lines. Gus Dur still enjoys support in 
the rural hinterland of East and Central Java where the 
organisation that he led for years, the Nahd~tul Ul~ma, 
enjoys a huge following. Elsewhere, the NU Is relat~~ely 
small among urban-based Muslims outside Java. Pohtt~al 
Islam was always quite plural and are at least sev~n Mushm 
political parties competed in ~h~ genera~ .elect10ns, each 
with their own agenda and distmct pohtl~~l subc~lture. 
Political Islam in Indonesia remains very divided, with no 
prospects of unity. As with all the other parties, clientele and 
money politics are still the dominant feature. 
Poisoned by intrigue from the start .. 
There have been many examples in the world oftrans1t10ns 
from autocratic regimes to democratic government, but they 
have varied enormously from place to place. In some cases 
transition has been accompanied by disintegration. Cynics 
will say that, despite the profound crisis in I~donesia, the 
country has not reached such a stage for the simple reas~n 
that the main components of the old New Order are still 
largely intact. 
From the start, Gus Dur's presidency involved many 
compromises with these components. He was catapulted into 
the presidency through an unholy alliance of Muslim parties 
which included two components of the New Order: Golkar 
and the PPP. This unholy alliance was strongly represented in 
his first cabinet: military and New Order politicians held 
important posts and as a result of numerous reshuftles, (at 
least fifteen up to the time he was sacked) in less than two 
years, New Order elements became even more prominent. 
The military gained richly from the chops and changes, even 
winning back the post of defence minister. The deadly 
alliances saved the skin of many officers who should have 
faced indictments for corruption and abuse of power. 
During the first two years of his presidency, Gus Dur 
pursued a puzzling two-pronged strategy, trying to take the 
path of reformasi while trying at the same time to please 
everybody, including New Order forces. The strategy soon 
backfired as the army and the New Order politicians and 
bureaucrats managed to regroup in such a favourable climate. 
The strategy forced Gus Dur to zigzag his way along creat-
ing yet more enemies at every tum. Let's take a look at this 
broad alliance, starting with the TNI-AD, the army. 
A military comeback 
The Suharto regime was basically a military regime. A junta 
in the early years, with Suharto at the top, it was later changed 
to be ruled by the same Suharto assisted by a small group of 
cronies and members of his family. The role of military intel-
ligence remained important throughout with the army func-
tioning more and more as an oppressive force to crush rebel-
lions and opposition in the cities. When Suharto was forced to 
stand down, there were very few top officers capable of func-
tioning as politicians. The army was in a bad shape, with its 
image in tatters. They had suffered humiliating defeat in East 
Timor and their acts of gross human rights violations were 
now widely publicised. 
Sad to say however, things changed dramatically after 
Gus Dur became president.. In 1998, the atmosphere was 
favourable enough to expect that General Wiranto, then the 
TNI commander-in-chief, would be charged for his role in 
mass murder in East Timor, Aceh and elsewhere. These 
days, Wiranto feels confident enough to go onto the off en-
sive. In May, he and several other senior officers filed a 
lawsuit against Dr. Thamrin Tomagola for 'falsely' accusing 
them of involvement in the Maluku riots. The chances of 
indictments against senior officers are now very remote (see 
separate article) and the former president's faltering efforts 
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to reform the army backfired and only helped to unified the 
several army factions. 
The 1999 general election helped to clip the wings of TNI 
and its representation in the DPR was reduced to 38 seats 
(although they resisted any suggestion that unelected repre-
sentation should end). In those days, TNI top-ranking offi-
cers were saying that the military would now take a back 
seat in politics but two years on, things are very different. 
The TNI parliamentary fraction voted in favour of censur-
ing the president (their supreme commander) in May while 
adopting a position of 'neutrality' in the second vote. Bein~ 
one of the smallest groups in parliament did not detract 
from that weight attached to their statements. The TNI 
spokesperson, Major General Hari Sabarno, was one of the 
most biting in his criticism of the president, thus clearing 
Megawati and her mass following 
the way for impeachment. 
While Gus Dur was forced onto the defensive in clinging 
on to power, the military made no attempt to conceal their 
intransigence. The second censure vote further eroded the 
president's position, though he continued to behave as if 
nothing could prevent him from holding on to power. 
When he made moves to replace the top TNI leadership in 
preparation for declaring an emergency and dissolving 
parliament, the top generals took counter-moves. The bitter 
irony was that now, a democratically elected head of state 
was contemplating dissolving parliament while the military, 
an institution without a shred of democracy in its being, 
claimed the moral high ground in their determination to 
oppose such an authoritarian move. 
The weaker Gus Dur grew, the more audacious the military 
became. In 2000, they had offered no resistance when 
General Wiranto was sacked and went along with the 
appointment of a civilian as defence minister. There was talk 
of gradually downsizing dwifungsi, which allows the mili-
tary to run the political system and the bureaucracy. But as 
Gus Dur weakened, they saw this as their chance to strike 
back. With the army being the most solid and best organised 
political institution in the country and the political elite bick-
ering furiously, the army paraded itself as 'a stabilising force'. 
A creeping coup d'etat 
On 24 May, General Endriartono Sutarto, the army chief-
of-staff, convened a meeting of senior officers and key 
retired officers. The purpose was clear, to reject any move 
by Gus Dur to replace the TNI leadership and to reject any 
move to declare a state of emergency. As supreme comman-
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der ofTNI, Wahid certainly had the powers to do all this so 
the meeting was an act of insubordination, in fact part of a 
creeping coup d'etat. 
A new unity had been forged in the TNI while the event 
passed off without anyone condemning it as an act of mutiny. 
All the factions were now on board, including retired offi-
cers. This was not the first time that the Indonesian armed 
forces had forged unity after being torn apart by rupture and 
division. Gus Dur's efforts to overhaul the TNI had come to 
a sticky end; instead the TNI's position as 'a state within a 
state' had been reinforced without a shot being fired. 
Since May one incident after another has only resulted in 
the erosion of civilian supremacy. On 28 May Gus Dur 
granted special powers to Lt General Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono (SBY), the then coordinating minister for polit-
ical, social and security affairs, as a step towards issuing an 
emergency decree. The general was given powers to take 
'all necessary actions, in co-ordination with the security 
forces, to handle the crisis and enforce order, security and 
the law as quickly as possible' . In effect, this made SBY the 
most powerful man in the land. But a few days after treat-
ing the general with such trust,, Gus Dur sacked him and 
appointed Lt.General Agum Gumelar in his place. Gumelar 
was soon to be appointed defence minister as well in a later 
cabinet merry-go-round. SBY, it turns out, was against 
issuing a decree so had to be removed. 
Police chief refuses to go 
The most bitter (and public) of Gus Dur's confrontations 
occurred when he announced the dismissal of Police 
General Bimantoro, the national chief of police. Bimanoro 
had made no secret of his intention to round up Gus Dur 
supporters, including members of the PRD.. Bimantoro 
rejected his dismissal and won the support of most top-
ranking officers in the force. In his defence, the police chief 
of Jakarta, General Sofyan Yacub convened a rally of police 
and military units close to the presidential palace in defi-
ance of the president, complete with tanks and armoured 
personal carriers. For the first time since the official sepa-
ration of the police from the TNI in 1998, the two forces had 
been united and were pursuing a common cause. 
When Gus Dur later ordered the arrest of Bimantoro, the 
order was ignored. His senior security affairs minister, Lt 
General Agum Gumelar urged the president to cancel the 
order while units of Brimob, the police crack troops, took 
up positions around Bimantoro's residence. 
There were many shows of open defiance from the top of 
the TNI: a 'roll call' of Kostrad troops, with its commander 
making a speech atop a tank, the placing of troops round the 
residence of Bimantoro to protect him from being arrested, 
a joint press conference by the speaker of the MPR and the 
TNI commander-in-chief endorsing the holding of a spe<;ial 
MPR session. These were moves that made a mockery of 
the TNl's professed neutrality. 
Golkar and the other parties 
The principle of pluralism was upheld in the 1998 elections 
but many of the parties that won seats were new kids on the 
block. Only Golkar, often described as the ruling party in 
the New Order, the PPP, the Muslim political federatioh and 
the PDI were old timers. Golkar had the advantage of~ solid 
infrastructure and most of the bureaucracy. PPP enjoyed 
fewer advantages as did the POI (now the PDI'-P).who 
fought the election under a new leadership. As was to be 
expected, these three parties came out as the big three in the 
elections. The other relatively new parties had to struggle 
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hard to win votes . For the vast majority of voters, this was 
their first experience of free elections. 
The new parl iament is a ragbag of old and new faces. 
Despite its image as the first parliament in the reformasi era, 
old-style politics have remained with the same old pattern of 
patron-client relationships. Becoming a member of parliament 
has turned out to be a privileged chance to climb the ladder of 
success and line the pockets of the 'people's representatives' 
Genuine reform has had little place in their endeavours follow-
ing a few months of reform minded actions. 
The declining national cake 
The members of the unholy alliance of Muslim groups 
plus Golkar tha brought Gus Dur to power were expecting 
to have juicy bits of the national cake come their way. But 
Gus Dur had little to offer, and what he did have went to his 
own followers . Very soon he was at loggerheads with his 
former promoters and removed some of his key Muslim 
ministers who had been appointed to 'repay' members of the 
central axis for their support. 
Two scandals were used against Gus Dur, the so-called 
Bulog-gate and Brunei-gate. Despite being cleared by the 
Attorney General's office of involvement in the two cases, it 
was evident that cronies within Gus Dur's inner circle were 
involved in these relatively minor scandals. Gus Dur, 
himself a product of the patron-client system, had allowed 
this to happen. It would appear to be true that deep resent-
ment in certain Muslim circles towards Gus Dur was 
simply based on the fact that the 'trickle down' effect had 
not applied to them. On the other hand, one of the failures 
of the Gus Dur government was its inability to end corrup-
tion or at least to bring it to 'manageable' levels. 
Megawati and the PDI-P 
Two years ago it was widely expected that Megawati 
would become the president. A clear winner with 31 per 
cent of the votes, it was a matter of finding suitable coali-
tion partners for her government. But a loose coalition of 
Muslim parties, the Central Axis, supported Gus Dur. 
History, it seems, has now corrected this injustice. 
Megawati has proven ineffective as vice president and 
probably agreed to be second fiddle to calm down her 
supporters gathered on the streets. Although the two are 
always presented as being 'the best of friends', having 
known each other since childhood, she was clearly not 
comfortable as his deputy and often acted wearing her 
other cap as chair of the PDI-P to express her frustrations. 
Her 'good friend' Gus Dur often insulted her in public with 
slurs and 'jokes' about her femininity, suggesting that she 
does not have the qualities to run the government. 
In the second year, the relationship between them soured 
an4 apart from the formalities required by their offices, they 
were not on speaking terms for months. At the 2000 MPR 
session, Gus Dur was heavily criticised and agreed to concede 
day-to-day governing to Megawati, retaining for himself the 
broad ·outline of government policies and the power to 
appmnt. ,ministers and other state officials. But the division of 
labour never worked, leading only to indecision and 
confusion. 
For her part, Megawati kept a low profile after losing the 
presidency, She kept her followers off the streets and 
retained the support of the majority of her party, while 
avoiding' playing a direct part in the ousting Gus Dur. As 
the daughter of Sukarno, she inherited a huge following but 
has yet to prove her skills as a political leader. 
PDI-P fractions 
Rifts within her own party have grown and the test will 
be whether she can keep the factions together or have to 
move to expel some people from the party. Broadly speak-
ing, the PDI-P is the main secular party in Indonesia and is 
~n essence a nationalist party. The nationalist wing within 
the party is quite conservative, representing the petty 
nationalist views of the past. There are two wings in the 
nationalist bloc: one wanted to preserve the Gus Dur-
Megawati alliance while the other wanted to oust Gus Dur. 
The military wing in the party has grown in importance, not 
only because of the retired TNI generals among its members 
but also because it enjoys the support of key active TNI offi-
cers. Previously Golkar was the political vehicle of the mili-
tary but today's top echelon officers feel more at home in the 
conservative PDI-P. 
Another small but 
important wing is the 
group of powerful 
businessmen around 
Arifin Panigoro, an 
oil tycoon who 
switched loyalties 
after 1998 from 
Golkar to the PDI-P. 
One of the few 
achievements of the 
post-Suharto era has 
been the requirement 
for key public office 
Taufiq Kiemas (I) and Arijin Pani- holders to reveal t~e.ir 
l d · , . . 1 d 1. personal wealth. Arifm goro, n onesia s priv1 ege e 1te. p . d 
amgoro emerge as 
the richest member of parliament with over US$200 
million, according to his own admission. Many reformers 
say people like him should be behind bars because of finan-
cial scandals and shady business deals with the Suharto 
family. Instead he has become a shining star in the PDI-P. 
Another key figure is Taufiq Kiemas, Megawati's husband, 
a self-confessed multi-millionaire. Known as TK, he is also 
a slick political operator who maintains good relations with 
the different wings in the party and will undoubtedly play a 
crucial role as 'the man behind the woman' now that she is 
'RI 1 ',the president's number plate. 
The PDI-P (then called the PDI) was one of Suharto's last 
victims when the PDI head office was stormed in July 1996 
and has enjoyed much sympathy from the pro-reform move-
ment. The reform wing, though small, is very active .and 
continues to demand that military and New Order elements 
be ousted from the party. But these are the forces that will 
be Megawati's political base as she takes over the presi-
dency for the coming three years. 
Getting Indonesia out of the economic and political crisis 
is a Herculanean job and will take many years of 'good 
governance '. Taking over the job from an impeached presi-
dent isn't the most elegant way of entering the state leader-
ship. Political analysts assess realistically that the coming 3 
years will be'tropical years' for Megawati. * 
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Aceh sinks deeper into war 
Since the Indonesian armed forces launched new military operations at the beginning of May, 
conditions for the population of Aceh have rapidly deteriorated. A massacre in Central Aceh 
resulted in scores of deaths. The death toll in the first half of 2001 exceeded one thousand, most 
victims being civilians. NGOs working on human rights and humanitarian issues are in constant 
danger, forcing many activists to flee, in fear for their lives. Para-military militias are now being 
trained and armed by the army. Peace talks in Geneva did nothing to end the slaughter. 
On 11 April, Presidential Instruction No IV, Inpres 
IV/2001, was issued providing for a six-point 'comprehen-
sive programme' for Aceh, intended to restore the machin-
ery oflocal government to the province. However, the 'secu-
rity' aspect is the only one to have been put into action. Well 
before the Instruction was announced, units of the army's 
elite forces and cmpanies from various parts of the country 
were getting special training in counter-insurgency at the 
training base of KOPAS SUS, in Batu Jajar, _Bandung, ready 
to be sent to Aceh. 
one of Indonesia's primary sources of foreign exchange was 
an additional reason for new military operations to be 
conducted. 
Jakarta's interests lie elsewhere 
While Aceh descends deeper into all-out war, Jakarta's 
attention is focused on the scramble for power within the 
political elite. The national press devotes little attention to 
Aceh while most reports that do appear are based on army 
handouts. The lack of news reporting is partly the result of 
threats to journalists and pressure on local 
newspapers about how events are reporting, 
coming from both sides of the conflict. 
The military operations have been conducted 
at the time of a virtual power vacuum in 
Jakarta. In June, parliament decided to call a 
special session of the supreme legislative body, 
the MPR, on 1 August to consider impeaching 
President Wahid. Vice-President Megawati is 
widely expected to take over as president. 
As compared with Wahid who has been in 
conflict with the armed forces leadership over 
wide-ranging reforms and over his intention to 
issue a decree that would enable him to 
dissolve parliament, Megawati is very close to 
the armed forces. While Wahid was very reluc-
tant to issue Presidential Instruction of 11 April 
(Inpres IV/2001) which gave the TNI the legal 
basis for renewed military operations, 
TNI Commander-in-Chief Widodo sending off fresh troops to Aceh Megawati is known to unreservedly support the mili-
tary and its declared aim of preventing the secession 
of Aceh at all costs. At a limited cabinet meeting on 14 June, 
she was quoted as expressing her confidence that this year's 
celebration of independence day on 17 August would be 
blessed by a 'special gift', the final solution of the Aceh 
question. The armed forces are working to her agenda 
(almost certainly designed by her TNI advisers), not 
Wahid's, which explains the intensity with which the opera-
tions have been conducted. 
Three days after the Instruction was announced, the armed 
forces (TNI) commander-in-chief, Admiral Widodo, 
announced the creation of a special army command known 
as KOLAKOPS (Komando Pelaksanaan Operasi TNI), for 
Aceh under the command of a KOPASSUS officer, 
Brigadier-General Zumroni. The joint police/army opera-
tions are known by the name OPSLIHKAM (Operasi 
Pemulihan Keamanan), Operation for the Restoration of 
Security. The command went into action on 2 May and 
since then the level of military operations has steadily inten-
sified. Counter-insurgency operations, mainly in the coun-
tryside, are in the hands of the army while the police 
confine their activities to the towns and cities. 
Very early on, extra troops were sent to Aceh to strengthen 
armed protection of the gas field and liquefaction gas plant 
installations in Arnn, North Aceh, following Exxon/Mobil's 
announcement that operations had been suspended from 9 
March because of the security situation. The shutdown of 
Another factor driving the TNI's determination to 'finish 
off GAM is the need to provide conducive security condi-
tions to persuade the giant US oil company, Exxon, to 
resume operations which were suspended on 9 March. The 
continued closure is having a severe impact on the economy 
in lost revenues and foreign exchange earnings and now 
poses a threat to Indonesia's overseas market for the LNG 
produced by the Arnn natural gas fields in Aceh. [See sepa-
rate article about Exxon.] 
Deputy director of the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation, 
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YLBHI, Munir said the decision to launch new operations 
ignored the fact, as history has shown, that military opera-
tions have never solved anything in Aceh, going back to the 
Dutch war against Aceh in the 19th century. He described 
the TNI's determination to 'solve' the Aceh question as an 
attempt to compensate for their defeat in East Timor. The 
military want to reinforce the myth that they, not civilian 
politicians, are the only ones capable of solving conflicts 
and restoring peace in Aceh. Munir said that ifthe TNI were 
really interested in resolving the Aceh situation and rolling 
back the growing distrust towards Indonesia, they could 
easily do this by putting past perpetrators of human rights 
on trial [Detik. com, 28 April 2001] This remarks applies 
with equal force to the situation in West Papua. 
Massacre in Central Aceh 
The day before talks between Indonesia and GAM were 
resumed in Geneva on 30 June, reports were received that 
twenty people had been killed in the village of Menderek, 
Timang Gajah in Central Aceh. While the security forces 
claimed they were all members of GAM, a GAM 
spokesperson insisted that only four of the dead were their 
members, and all the others were ordinary civilians. As the 
days passed, it became clear that the massacre in Menderek 
was the tip of the iceberg. The death toll mounted with 
reports from local hospitals and an Indonesian Red Cross 
team saying by 2 July that 62 bodies had been found, many 
with gunshot wounds and many charred beyond recogni-
tion. In mid July, TAPOL received a list of 184 people who 
had been killed in Central Aceh, along with the place of 
burial. The list was described as 'preliminary'. 
Reports of serious disturbances in Central Aceh, of 
numerous houses having been burnt down, began to emerge 
earlier in June. On that occasion, the attacks appear to have 
come from GAM units, seeking to drive out the Javanese. 
Until then, Central Aceh was a region of calm; even during 
the DOM period ( 1989-1998), the district was untouched by 
the horrors that struck elsewhere. 
There is a sizable Javanese population in Central Aceh, 
consisting not so much of recently arrived transmigrants but 
of people from Java and Tapanuli who settled in the 
province many decades ago. It is here that the security 
forces first began to set up and train para-military militias, 
recruited primarily from the Javanese. This is what seems 
to have angered local GAM units. 
Central Aceh is also the home of a distinct ethnic group, 
the Gayo, who till recently, kept a distance from Acehnese 
aspirations. They have now been drawn into the conflict 
with some of their members joining forces with GAM. 
According to reports from an observer in Central Aceh, 
Brimob and army troops have emptied three-quarters of the 
villages in some parts of Central Aceh. Gardens have been 
ravaged, animals killed and houses razed. Tens of thousands 
of Acehnese have fled their villages, suggesting a compari-
son with the huge displacement of the population of East 
Tim or, in the wake of the ballot in August 1999. 
On 7 July, AFP reported the discovery of 29 bodies in 
Matangkuli, North Aceh, scattered in a ravine in the Krueng 
Tuan and Salak Mountain range in Matangkuli, 31 miles 
west ofLhokseumawe. The bodies bore marks showing they 
had died violent deaths. The agency quoted a local journal-
ist as saying 400 residents of Central Aceh had taken refuge 
in the Matangkuli area after being forced to flee their homes 
by military-led militias; they had taken a week t~ r~ach their 
destination. Other sources suggested that the v1ct1ms were 
local residents who had fled their homes when troops made 
'sweepings' in their villages. 
These reports prompted TAPOL to call on the British 
government to press for the UN Special Rapporteur on 
Extrajudicial, Summary and Arbitrary Executions to 
conduct an investigation in Aceh. 
Monitoring the mounting death toll 
Meanwhile, elsewhere in Aceh, human rights NGOs have 
been attempting with great difficulty to keep a tally of the 
numbers killed. The Legal Aid Institute (LBH) in Banda 
A state of siege in the capital Banda Aceh 
Aceh said on 1 June that they had recorded 155 deaths since 
Inpres IV /2001 was announced on 11 April, an average of 
25 deaths a week. Estimates of the number of deaths since 
the beginning of 2001 had reached one thousand by the end 
of June. Almost daily reports in the latter half of June 
suggest that there were on average five killings a day. 
While all sources agree that the numbers dying are 
increasing throughout the province, it is not always possible 
to establish who was responsible. The security forces and 
GAM invariably give contradictory accounts. In those cases 
where monitors have been able to record the testimony of 
local people, the security forces are almost always to blame. 
Faisal Hadi of the Aceh Coalition of Human Rights NGOs 
highlighted the problem of accurate monitoring: 
In the field, the soldiers or the police seem like they regard 
all of the Acehnese as GAM. But when people make a 
report or complain to their (local) commanders, they always 
say that you have to give the name and the unit of the 
soldiers (responsible). But it's very hard ... because they 
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IPU questions police investigations 
The Inter-Parliamentary Union has launched a special 
inquiry into the abduction on 21 January 2000 of Tengku 
Nashiruddin Dauci, an Acehnese member of the 
Indonesian parliament, the DPR. The MP disappeared in 
Medan while on his way back to Jakarta following a visit 
to Aceh. His body was found two days later covered with 
wounds suggesting that he had been tortured. 
At the time of his death, Nashiruddin was deputy chair-
man of the Independent Commission to Investigate 
Violations in Aceh, set up in 1999, when B.J. Habibie was 
president. He had distinguished himself as an outspoken 
member of the Commission and shortly before his death, 
he robustly challenged several top-ranking retired military 
officers who had been summoned by the DPR to answer 
questions about atrocities in Aceh during the DOM period, 
when Aceh was designated a 'military operations zone'. 
The televised encounter had the nation glued to their 
screens. 
At the meeting of the IPU Council in Havana in April this 
year, a resolution was adopted expressing concern that 
police investigations ofNashiruddin's murder had failed as 
yet to produce conclusive results and expressed concern 
that 'only one line of inquiry seems to have been pursued', 
namely that GAM was responsible for the murder. 
Key witness disappears 
At the meeting of its Committee for Human Rights of 
Parliamentarians in June, the IPU discussed new informa-
tion that had been brought to its attention, namely that a 
young man, Abubakar Daud, who worked as a servant at 
the hostel where the MP was staying when he was 
abducted was summoned by the police to be questioned as 
a witness. However, the young man subsequently disap-
peared and nothing is known of his whereabouts. The 
Committee expressed alarm 'at the disappearance of a key 
witness', wanted to know whether the authorities had 
launched an investigation into his disappearance and 
urged the Indonesian parliament to enquire into the disap-
pearance which it considers 'adds weight to the concerns 
(the Committee) has expressed regarding the conduct of 
the police investigation'. 
The IPU's Human Rights Committee has under constant 
review the cases of 31 parliamentarians from around the 
l world. * I 
frequently don't wear their official uniform, just put on a 
black shirt.' [Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 21 June 
2001] Here are some examples of what has been happening: 
On 18 June, a couple and their 18-year old daughter were 
found dead on Lampu'uk beach in Aceh Besar with bullet 
wounds in the chest and their faces smashed beyond recog-
nition. The police said they had died during an armed clash 
with the 'rebels' but GAM said there had been no armed 
clash. Local people said the family had been kidnapped by 
an armed group riding a Kijang vehicle. [Cordova Post, 30 
June 2001] 
In a widely reported incident, three schoolboys were killed 
on the same day as the above incident was reported. The 
killing occurred following the gunning down outside a 
I 
ACEH 
school in Krueng Sa bee, West Aceh of a member of Brim ob 
by GAM. In revenge, police raided the school. Although it 
was a Sunday, schoolboys were there to register for a univer-
sity entrance exam. During the raid, the police rounded up 
thirty youngsters and two members of staff. 'The three 
students died after being taken to the police headquarters 
which is about two kilometers (1.5 miles) from the school,' 
the source said, adding that several other students were 
injured. [AFP, 18 June] 
On the same day too, five bodies were discovered by the 
roadside in Babah, Buloh, BlangPidie. The bodies had 
gunshot wounds and had been tortured. The security forces 
said they died in a round-up of GAM members, while GAM 
said the five men had been kidnapped by soldiers on 13 
April. [Cordova Post, 30 June] 
Such a confluence of reports on a single day is now becom-
ing the norm in Aceh. 
N GOs targeted 
Ever since the abduction and brutal murder of Jafar Siddiq 
Hamzah, the founder and chairperson of the International 
Forum on Aceh, in August 2000, there has been a deliber-
ate campaign by the security forces to undermine and 
destroy the community of NGOs in Aceh dedicated to alert-
ing national and international opinion about the human 
rights situation in Aceh. 
In December 2000, three volunteers working for RATA, 
the Rehabilitation Action for Victims of Torture in Aceh, 
were gunned down by a unit consisting of members of the 
security forces and civilian associates. The murders were 
widely condemned and eight men were arrested, including 
four soldiers. However, four have since escaped and there is 
no news about whether the others are likely to go on trial. 
Three months later, a well-known member of one of the 
joint monitoring committees working for the Humanitarian 
Pause was shot dead twenty minutes after leaving a police 
station where he had been questioned. He had been 
summoned in connection with the case of five women who 
were given protection by Kontras-Aceh (Committee for the 
Disappeared and Victims of Violence), after they alleged 
that they had been raped by members of Brimob. The ~ 
women were later taken into police custody where they 
reversed their story, according to the police, now accusing 
GAM of having ordered them to accuse Brimob members of 
rape. The murdered man, Al Kamal, killed along with his 
lawyer and their driver, was travelling in a car clearly 
marked as belonging to the joint monitoring team. 
This incident has been used by the police to accuse 
Kontras-Aceh activists of maligning their force because 
they had caused the story to be reported in the press. 
Besides facing serious charges, Kontras has been forced to 
curtail its monitoring activities because local volunteers 
were not able to submit their findings about local 
atrocitices. Besides the dangers attached to monitoring inci-
dents, they are also too scared to visit shops to fax their 
reports because of the proximity of the security forces. 
Rare glimpse of Aceh's horrors by journalist 
Press reports by domestic and foreign journalists direct 
from Aceh are infrequent nowadays because of a deliberate 
policy by the security forces to keep the press out. A recent 
exception was a report in two leading Australian newspa-
pers by a journalist who visited the village of Ujung Reuba, 
continued on page 2 7 
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Peace talks sabotaged 
A new round of talks between the Indonesian Government and GAM failed to ma~e any progress. 
Jakarta unilaterally suspended the operations of the key joint committee on security. Three .weeks 
later, GAM negotiators were arrested by the Indonesian police while follow-up talks were going on 
in Banda Aceh, striking the final blow to the talks. 
8 
The arrest in Banda Aceh of four members of the GAM 
negotiating team on 20 July while talks were going on between 
the two sides was a serious breach of faith and the clearest sign 
that the Indonesian security forces were bent on sabotaging 
these efforts. The arrests, which took place as political 
tensions reached a new pitch in Jakarta over the Wahid presi-
dency, distracting attention from developments in Aceh, were 
in flagrant violation of security guarantees given by the 
Indonesian side at talks held three weeks earlier in Geneva. 
Besides the four negotiators, a member of the security modal-
ities monitoring team and another person were also arrested. 
The talks in Banda Aceh had been convened to follow up 
decisions adopted in Geneva on 30 June-1 July during talks 
held under the auspices of the Henri Dunant Centre. 
Arrested by the police 
The arrests took place at the Kuala Tripa Hotel in Banda 
Aceh where the talks had been going and where the negotia-
tors from both sides were staying. This hotel was also used as 
theheadquarters for the Henri Dunant Centre. More than two 
dozen heavily-armed members of Brimob, the Mobile 
Brigade of the Indonesian police, stormed the hotel while 
others stood on guard outside the building. The arrested men 
were taken to police headquarters in the city. 
The arrested men are: Nashiruddin Ahmed, Arnni A 
Marzuki and Hamdy Hamid, all members of the Joint 
Committee on Security Modalities, Teungku 
Kamaruzzaman, a member of the Joint Committee on 
Humanitarian Affairs, (all members of the GAM negotiat-
ing team), Nashrullah Dahlawi, a member of the Joint 
Monitoring Committee on Security Modalities, and 
Mohamad Usman, thought to be a member ofGAM but not 
in any way connected with the negotiations. 
On the day after the arrests, the police announced that the 
four GAM negotiators and one other detainee were under 
intense interrogation and will be charged for rebellion, 
under Article 106 of Indonesia's Criminal Code for which 
the maximum penalty is life. The sixth detainee, Nashrullah 
Dahlawi, was released. The GAM leadership warned that 
failure to release their negotiators would be met with a 
powerful response. 
This blatant breach of faith will not go unnoticed by the 
Acehnese people and can only deepen their deep distrust of 
the Indonesian security forces. 
The day before the arrests, members of Indonesia's negoti-
ating team composed of senior police officers, had warned 
that these arrests would be made, adding that observers from 
the Henri Dunant Centre team would also be ordered to leave 
Aceh. [Waspada, 19 July] It is understood that the Centre 
was asked to leave Aceh by the Indonesian Foreign Ministry. 
In a statement condemning the arrests, Human Rights 
Watch warned that they could trigger all-out war. Its Asia 
director, Sidney Jones said: 'With the arrests. of people 
whose security it had guaranteed, the Indonesian govern-
ment is showing that commitments it makes with regard to 
Aceh are worthless. This could be a signal for all-out war.' 
Geneva talks 
The talks three weeks earlier in Geneva were described as 
being a meeting of the 'Joint Council for Political Dialogue', 
as if a new stage had been reached in the dialogue. But what 
in fact happened was that the Indonesian side took a unilat-
eral decision at the negotiations to suspend the Joint 
Committee on Security Modalities, on the grounds that 
GAM had not agreed to a meeting between their top 
commander in the field Abdullah Syafe'i and the comman-
der of the Bukit Barisan regional military command based 
in Medan which includes Aceh. (The arrests in Banda Aceh 
signify that GAM's caution was well-founded!) The 
Indonesian side had also sought a statement from GAM 
regarding the operations of the natural gas installations in 
Aceh run by ExxonMobil. 
The JCSM was the body set up under the Humanitarian 
Pause accord reached in May 2000 to allow both sides to 
file complaints about violations of the ceasefire under the 
terms of the accord. The real reason for its suspension is that 
the security forces needed to remove this organ so as to free 
themselves from any observation while military operations 
set in train by the April 11 Presidential Instruction 
proceeded. Its suspension was in fact the final blow to the 
talks. The idea of reaching a negotiated settlement had been 
promoted by President Wahid but as his political demise 
became assured, the security forces saw their opportunity to 
end the fa9ade once and for all. 
As we have reported earlier, the Humanitarian Pause which 
came into force at the beginning of June 2000 had little if 
any effect on conditions on the ground. It is no coincidence 
that on the day the GAM negotiators were arrested, the 
armed forces in Jakarta dispatched additional troops 
consisting of three Yon Gab, Goint battalions) of 2,000 men 
to Aceh consisting of specially-trained troops from the 
marines, the air force Paskhas and the army. Similar forces 
have recently been in operation in Maluk:u (see separate 
article). This is likely to be a special task force to capture 
and destroy GAM's local and regional units and annihilate 
their commanders. * 
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Exxon taken to court in the US 
Exxon, the world's largest oil company, has been taken to court in a US court, accused of complic-
ity with the Indonesian military in egregious human rights violations in Aceh. The case, filed on 
behalf of eleven plaintiffs, makes grave charges against the company for its close collaboration with 
the Indonesian armed forces, employed by it to provide its installations with 'security' 
The lawsuit was filed in the District of Columbia court on 
11 June by the Washington-based International Labour Rights 
Fund and is based on two US laws, the Alien Tort Claims Act 
under which foreign citizens can sue corporations in the US for 
according to the suit, the company also controlled and directed 
the security forces , 'making decisions about where to place 
bases, strategic mission planning and making decisions about 
specific deployment areas. (Indeed, it is a recognised part of 
human rights abuses, and the Torture Victim 
Protection Act which allow foreign victims of 
torture to sue corporations or individuals in the 
US. 
The eleven Acehnese plaintiffs, seven men 
and four women, are not named in the lawsuit, 
special dispensation having been granted by the 
court to allow the plaintiffs to remain anony-
mous. As the lawsuit states, 'if they complained 
to the military authorities, they would face 
certain retribution and punishment'. 
The lawsuit charges that the plaintiffs 'have 
been subjected to serious human rights abuses 
including genocide, murder, torture, crimes 
against humanity, sexual violence in violation 
of the Alien Tort Claims Act . . . and the Torture 
Victims Protection Act'. 
Complicity with Suharto 
ExxonMobil as the company is now known was . 
created as the result of a merger on 30 November TN/ crack troops on constant watch at the EXXONMOBIL site 
1999 between Exxon Corporation and Mobil Corporation, the 'duties' of the Indonesian armed forces to provide protec-
owners of Mobil Oil Indonesia (MOI). 'Having reported tion for so-called 'vital enterprises' which they have also been 
approximately $210 billion in revenue for the year 2000, providing for three decades to the Freeport copper and gold 
ExxonMobil,' the lawsuit states, 'ExxonMobil is now listed as mine in West Papua.) 
the largest publicly held American corporation by the maga- By the time of the merger between Exxon and Mobil Oil, 
zine Fortune. In calendar year 2000, ExxonMobil reported the there was a 'clear public record of pervasive and systematic 
world's largest corporate profits'. human rights violations perpetrated upon the innocent non-
Having discovered a large natural gas field in Arun, Aceh in combatant villagers of Aceh by the TNI troops specifically 
the early 1970s, Mobil Oil obtained exclusive rights over the hired to provide "security" for the Arnn Project'. This included 
exploitation of these reserves 'from the brutal military regime provision for two military barracks located near the installa-
headed by General Suharto ... in exchange for providing the tions, commonly referred to as 'Post 113' and 'Rancong Camp' 
Suharto family with "blank shares" in MOI as well as other which were used by Kopassus (special forces) units to interro-
forms of direct and indirect payment'. Since then, the Arnn gate, torture and murder Acehnese civilians suspected of 
Project which incorporates the extraction facilities now owned engaging in separatist activities. It also included the provision 
by ExxonMobil, and the liquefaction plant owned by the state of heavy equipment so that the Indonesian military could dig 
company, Pertamina (55 per cent), Exxon (35 per cent) and a mass graves to bury their Acehnese victims, and the use of 
Japanese company (10 per cent), 'has been one of the largest roads constructed by the companies to transport the military's 
and most profitable natural gas projects in the world and has victims to mass graves located near company premises. 
helped catapult Indonesia as one of the world's largest natural Since the collapse of the Suharto regime, the defendants' 
gas producers and exporters'. 'security' service, the TNI, have continued without restraint to 
The suit charges that because of the extreme unpopularity of practice 'ethnic genocide', while the company has ignored 
the Suharto regime, security was an essential element and the pleas by numerous human rights groups to cease its operations 
Project's activities 'could not have been performed without a in Aceh until it can make arrangements to operate without 
heavy military presence'. Hence troops were assigned for that using the murderous TNI for security. 
purpose, for which the company pays a regular fee. Moreover, 
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A litany of abuses 
All the plaintiffs, referred to simply as John or Jane Doe, 
were subjected to abuses at the hands of troops guarding the 
company's premises. One plaintiff was shot in the wrist, had a 
grenade thrown at him and was left for dead. He lost a hand 
and his left eye. The second was forced onto a truck, beaten 
severely on the head and body, blindfolded and taken to 
Rancong where he was tortured for months. The third was shot 
three times in the leg then dragged to a post where he was 
tortured while his gunshot wounds bled, had his skull cracked 
and was burnt with cigarettes. He was finally released after a 
bribe was paid. The fourth was beaten by soldiers, accused of 
being GAM and had the letters 'GAM' carved on his back with 
a knife. The fifth was held in a building inside the company's 
complex, tortured with cigarettes and electricity, sustaining 
severe injuries to his head and body. His captors also beat his 
son and broke his leg. The sixth plaintiff was tortured then 
taken to his village and ordered to identify all villagers who 
were members of GAM. When he denied knowing any GAM 
members, he was beaten and shot in the leg. After hospitalisa-
tion, he was tortured again, suffering more severe injuries. 
Finally, his village head made a collection in the village and 
bribed the police to release him. Male plaintiff No 7 was taken 
by his captors to an office inside the company compound 
where he was beaten with the butt of a gun and a hammer, 
sustaining severe injuries. 
The house of the first female plaintiff, who was pregnant at 
the time, was forcibly entered by a soldier who threatened to 
kill her and her unborn child, then sexually assaulted her. The 
second woman plaintiff's husband was shot dead while work-
ing in a field, while the third woman's husband was taken from 
their home at gunpoint and never re-appeared. Female plaintiff 
No 4 also lost her husband when he was working in a field 
where he was shot and killed. 
The court was requested to award the plaintiffs compensatory 
and punitive damages and to enjoin the defendant from further 
engaging in human rights abuses against the plaintiffs and their 
fellow villagers in complicity with the Indonesian government 
and military. 
Pertamina: 'We're responsible' 
In response to the lawsuit, Exxon issued a statement 'cate-
gorically' denying any suggestion that it or its affiliate compa-
nies were involved in abuses by the security forces. For its part, 
Pertamina claimed that it was responsible for ExxonMobil 
security. 'The protection for all vital installations is the respon-
sibility of Pertamina,' the company said, adding that it was 
common for the company to ask for assistance from the 
government if its vital installations came under threat. The 
president-director denied that they financed troops, but 'simply 
provided some health, housing and transportation facilities for 
the security officers ... in return for their services in guarding 
our facilities'. [Jakarta Post, 23 June 2001] 
No one should expect early results from the lawsuit. Other 
cases, against Unocal in Burma and Shell/Chevron in Nigeria, 
are currently under consideration in US courts and it could take 
years for a verdict to be handed down. 
Exxon and US policy 
Three months before the lawsuit was filed, Exxon halted all 
its operations in Arun for reasons of security. Four days later, 
the Indonesian cabinet adopted a decision to declare GAM a 
'separatist' organisation and set in motion preparations for an 
all-out offensive in Aceh. This came with Presidential 
Instruction No IV/2001 (Inpres/IV) on 11 April and the 
commencement of military operations on 2 May. A primary 
aim of the operations was the need to persuade Exxon to 
resume operations, as the shutdown was costing the Indonesian 
state $100 million a month in revenue and a possible meltdown 
of its guaranteed overseas market for liquefied natural gas. 
Even before specially-trained counter-insurgency troops were 
sent to Aceh from various parts of Indonesia with a mission 'to 
crush GAM' , an additional 2,000 troops were sent to increase 
'security' at the Arun field. 
Since the shutdown, there have been several explosions and 
attacks on company premises for which GAM has been 
blamed. The GAM leadership says that their units were not 
responsible and indeed would not have been able to penetrate 
the security surrounding the installation, had they wanted to. 
As the months have passed, Jakarta's efforts to persuade Exxon 
to resume operations have become more and more frenzied, 
including threats from Pertamina to take over the company or 
to insist on a shake-up of its executives. As we went to press, 
operations were expected to resume in mid-July. 
US government policy on the question of Aceh is heavily 
focused on safeguarding Exxon's continued existence in 
Indonesia. This holds true especially since George W Bush 
took office; Exxon contributed $1.2 million to the Bush elec-
tion war chest, one of the biggest donors. 
During the talks in Geneva between the Indonesian govern-
ment and GAM on 30 June/l July, a key demand from Jakarta 
was for GAM to give a written assurance that it would not 
attack the installations; TAPOL understand that there was also 
strong pressure along these lines from the US shortly before 
the talks took place. For reasons known best to itself, GAM 
was not willing to give any such assurances, apparently 
because, to have done so would have meant acknowledging 
that they had been responsible for past attacks. * 
************************************************* 
continuation from page 26 
(SPMS), is affiliated to the International Union of Food. 
Hotel and Restaurant Workers, the IUF which has 
expressed full support for the strikers. The union filed a 
formal complaint against the mass dismissal of their 
members with the I.L.O in Geneva. TheACTU in Australia 
also came out in support of the striking Shangri-La 
workers. * 
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Rights trials still a distant dream 
More than three years have passed since Suharto was overthrown. Grave human rights abuses 
occurred for more than three decades. Victims, NGOs, lawyers have urged that the perpetrators be 
called to account. In some cases, investigation teams have been hard at work. A law on human rights 
courts has been passed and provisions introduced for ad hoc courts to be set up to handle the older 
violations. But no one can predict when the first human rights trial will actually take place. 
Although the necessary laws (albeit flawed) are in place, 
the malaise goes far deeper. The fundamental problems are 
political and institutional. As the military re-asserts its polit-
ical position and factions within the ruling political elite build 
their own alliances with the army, the chances of bringing the 
perpetrators to justice recede with every passing day. 
The judiciary is also incapable of handling these crimes 
and the prosecution service needs a complete overhaul to 
weed out elements who have no training or conception of 
what is meant by crimes against humanity. 
Shortly before he died on 3 July, Attorney General, 
Baharuddin Lopa, suggested that the country would need 
more than two decades to combat corruption institution-
alised within the judicial system. He called the network of 
corruption within the judicial system a 'mafia' entangling all 
levels of the country's legal system [Jakarta Post, 6 June] . 
His untimely death will almost certainly scupper efforts to 
eliminate corrupt practices. 
Rulers' justice 
The princi-
ple of judicial 
independence 
and impartial-
ity is routinely 
ignored by 
t h o s e 
supposed to 
uphold the 
law. A series 
of recent 
cases involv-
ing political 
activists in 
West Papua 
and Aceh has 
demonstrated 
that the law, 
Baharuddin Lopa died before even prop- the courts and 
er/y starting his anti-corruption drive the judiciary 
continue to 
serve the interests of the State and those in power instead of 
upholding individual rights and freedoms [see separate item 
on the Wamena prisoners]. While impunity persists for 
state agents responsible for egregious rights abuses, inde-
pendence supporters are imprisoned for peaceful political 
activities. 
The law is also used by those who should themselves be 
in the dock to stifle freedom of expression, as in the case of 
General (ret.) Wiranto and three other army generals suing 
University of Indonesia sociologist Thamrin Amal 
Tomagola for accusing them of provoking communal 
conflict in Maluku [Jakarta Post, 1 May 2001]. All this is 
more characteristic of a dictatorship than a democracy 
based on the rule of law. It is a clear sign that the transition 
to democracy in Indonesia still has a very long way to go. 
The fact that the former dictator and greatest criminal of 
them all, Suharto, continues to evade justice is the ultimate 
symbol of a corrupt and unreformed system. His freedom, 
and that of other notorious rights abusers, encourages others 
to expect they will also enjoy impunity for past and future 
crimes, however heinous. 
International tribunal needed for Timor crimes 
Any glimmer of hope that Indonesia might bring to trial the 
22 persons named by the Attorney General as suspects in 
cases of crimes against humanity committed in East Timor 
in 1999 came crashing to the ground when President Wahid 
announced the establishment of an ad hoc court for East 
Timor that would only try crimes committed after the 
August 1999 ballot. It was bad enough that a UN investiga-
tion team and an Indonesian-appointed team had limited 
their investigations to what happened in 1999, ignoring the 
more than two decades of military crimes in East Tirnor. 
The President's announcement came within days of 
Indonesia agreeing to a formal statement at the UN 
Commission on Human Rights which committed it to 
ensure accountability for crimes committed in East Tirnor 
during the whole of 1999. 
Indonesia's inability and unwillingness to administer cred-
ible justice in relation to gross violations of human rights was 
demonstrated by the outcome in May 2001 of proceedings 
against those accused of involvement in the killing of three 
employees of the UN High Commission for Refugees 
(UNHCR) in Atambua, West Timor in September 2000 and 
by the impunity enjoyed by notorious militia leader, Eurico 
Guterres (see below). 
Further evidence of Indonesia's failure to uphold the rule 
of law lies in its refusal to fulfil its obligations under a 
memorandum of understanding on legal co-operation with 
the UN administration in East Tirnor (UNTAET). 
Minor players are now facing justice in East Timor, but the 
process is slow and unlikely to result in the conviction of 
Indonesian army officers ultimately responsible for the 
violence and killings [see TAPOL Bulletin No. 161, p. 12]. 
Ten Team Alpha militia members, on trial on crimes against 
humanity charges including the murders of a group of nuns 
and priests in the Los Palos area on 25 September 1999, 
have testified that they were created by the Indonesian 
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armed forces in the mid-1980s, that they were trained and 
armed by the Kopassus special forces and that they shared a 
base with Kopassus at the headquarters of Battalion 745 in 
Los Palos. [See Judicial Systems Monitoring Project, Dili, 
reports, 10 and 13 July.] A Kopassus officer charged with the 
militias is still at large in Indonesia and unlikely to face trial. 
No other Indonesian army officers have been charged. 
An international tribunal is regarded by many as the only 
viable option to deliver Indonesian officers and other leading 
suspects to justice. In June this year, 45 aid agencies and 
human rights groups, including TAPOL, issued a statement at 
an international donor conference on East Timor in Canberra 
urging the international community to set up an international 
tribunal 'to bring to justice Indonesian military officers and 
others responsible for gross violations of human rights when-
ever they were committed'. At the same conference the East 
Timor NGO Forum asked the donors to provide funds for a 
conference on an international tribunal in Dili. 
Later in June, East Timor's de facto government, the 
National Council, voted overwhelmingly to back the forma-
tion of an international tribunal [Sydney Morning Herald, 
22 June]. In July, East Timor's political affairs minister, 
Peter Galbraith, supported calls for a tribunal saying 'he'd 
"seen very little evidence" that Indonesia was serious in its 
efforts to bring to trial those responsible for the violence' 
[AP, 13 July]. 
Crimes against humanity are crimes of universal jurisdic-
tion and the international community has a special respon-
sibility to ensure that the perpetrators are brought to justice. 
It has an additional moral responsibility in relation to the 
East Timor crimes because many of them were committed 
when the UN was administering the 'popular consultation' 
or after it abandoned the territory despite promises that it 
would stay after the vote. 
The Milosevic case, now before the international criminal 
tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, demonstrates that politi-
cal and military leaders responsible for war crimes and 
crimes against humanity are not immune from international 
justice. Western powers, which insisted on Milosevic's 
transfer to the tribunal in The Hague will continue to be 
charged with hypocrisy so long as Indonesian military 
suspects are not made to account for their alleged crimes. 
Trial of UNHCR murderers a farce 
A taster of what can be expected from the Indonesian judi-
ciary was the trial of six men accused of the murder of three 
UNHCR officials in Atambua, West Timor. The killings 
occurred on 6 September 2000 when the three officials, 
Samson Aragahegn (44) from Ethiopia, Carlos Luis Careres-
Collazo (33) from the US and Pero Simundza (29), a Croat, 
were hacked to death by a gang of twenty to thirty pro-
Jakarta militias wielding machetes and rifles in a poorly-
protected UNHCR office close to the border with East Timor. 
Their bodies were then doused with kerosene and set on fire . 
The murders, which were described by a senior UN offi-
cial as 'the worse ever attack against UNHCR staff, led to 
the immediate closure of the agency's operations in West 
Timor and the withdrawal of all its staff. They had been 
there to tend to the needs of more than 100,000 East 
Timorese refugees still being held to ransom by militia 
thugs, living in appalling conditions in camps, and with a 
mandate to help those wishing to do so to return home. In 
the absence of the UNHCR and other international agencies 
that also decided to leave, militia gangs could control the 
camps without observation by the UN. 
Given that - in the words of a US Senate resolution passed 
on 20 June - the murders 'fit a pattern of killings perpetrated, 
sanctioned or condoned by certain elements within the 
Indonesian military in Timor, both during and since the end of 
the Suharto regime', they were arguably crimes against 
humanity and should have been investigated as such. If neces-
sary, an ad hoc human rights court for the trials ~hould have 
been set up under Indonesia's new law on human .nghts courts. 
Although this was without doubt a premeditated atta~k, 
the three men charged with the attack were charged with 
manslaughter, not murder. However, even this charg~ ~as 
dropped because, the presiding judge argued, the victims 
died at the hands of a mob, making it difficult to know the 
identities of the killers. He even alleged that the fact that the 
bodies were burnt beyond recognition made it more difficult 
to identify the killers. The three were given sentences of 
between 16 and 20 months. Two others were given ten 
months each for 'conspiring to incite violence' while a sixth 
man got 15 months for causing damage to property. 
The derisory sentences were strongly condemned around 
the world. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan described the 
verdicts as being 'incommensurate with what is known to 
have been deliberate and brutal killings'. 
Indonesian lawyers and NGOs rounded on the prosecutors 
for the lamentable way they had prepared the charges. 
Asmara Nababan, secretary-general of the National Human 
Rights Commission criticised the prosecution for its 
handling of the case. Abdul Hakim Nusantara of ELSAM 
said the verdicts amounted to impunity, not punishment. He 
said that Indonesia's Criminal Code clearly stipulates that 
premeditated murder is punishable with a life sentence or 
even with death. [Jakarta Post, 8 May 2001] 
Enrico Guterres goes free 
One of the most prominent beneficiaries of Indonesia's 
flawed justice system is the former head of the feared Dili-
based Aitarak ('thorn') militia group, Eurico Guterres, now 
enjoying a reputation as one of Indonesia's national heroes. 
Guterres was named as a suspect in the report of the 
Indonesian Commission for Human Rights Violations in 
East Timor (KPP-HAM), published in January 2000. In 
April 1999, he was filmed inciting a militia gathering to 
attack and 'kill if necessary' members of the family of inde-
pendence leader Manuel Carrascalao. The same day at least 
12 persons were killed when the Carrascalao house was 
attacked by a militia mob. 
Guterres was subsequently involved in the forcible depor-
tation of an estimated 250,000 to 300,000 East Timorese 
into West Timor and then appeared in Atambua just before 
the UNCHR workers were killed last September. A few 
weeks after the killings, he led a militia group which seized 
from the police weapons they had previously surrendered. 
He was arrested and sentenced to six months imprisonment 
for that offence, but served only 23 days in relative comfort 
under house arrest in a government housing complex in 
Jakarta. He is now enjoying life leading a local youth wing 
of Vice President Megawati Sukarnoputri's Democratic 
Party of Struggle (PDI-P), chairing an anti-communist 
organisation called the Front of the Red and White 
Defenders and in the style of fellow serious crimes suspect, 
General Wiranto, recording songs, in this case castigating 
the UN in East Timor. 
Other leading suspects enjoying life 'on the run' include 
Major-General Adam Damiri - the most senior general with 
direct command in East Timor in 1999 - now in charge of 
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troop deployments to Aceh where East Timor-style militia 
groups are being set up [see separate item]. 
Others have been promoted as a reward for their efforts. 
Tono Suratman - the senior commander in East Timor for most 
of 1999 - has been promoted to colonel, his replacement M. 
Nur Muis - in charge during the September 1999 rampage -
has been promoted to brigadier general and Yacob Sarosa - the 
commander of Battalion 745 - has been promoted to lieutenant 
colonel [Christian Science Monitor, 7 May, 2001] 
Military court hearing Trisakti case 
Meanwhile, outrage greeted a decision by the Indonesian 
Parliament in July to hand over the Trisakti student killings in 
Jakarta in 1998 to a military court instead of setting up an ad 
hoc human rights court to handle this crime against humanity. 
The killings took place nine days before Suharto was 
forced to resign on 21 May 1998, when four students of 
Trisakti University in Jakarta were shot dead by police, as 
they were returning to their campus after a peaceful demon-
stration. The tragedy, coming at the climax of nationwide 
student demonstrations calling for the dictator's resignation, 
led to three days of rioting, which the troops in Jakarta did 
nothing to prevent. More that a thousand people of Chinese 
extraction were killed, scores of Chinese women were raped 
and there was widespread destruction in mainly Chinese 
commercial centres in Jakarta and several other cities. 
and relatives of the victims, demanding that the army and 
police officers who ordered the killings be called to 
account. Their campaign also includes the killing of 
students in two later events, Semanggi I and Semanggi II. 
Semanggi I occurred on 13 November 1998 when 13 
students were shot dead inside their campus and scores were 
injured during demonstrations against a special session of 
the supreme legislative assembly. Semanggi II occurred in 
late 1999, when students demonstrated against a new secu-
rity law. On that occasion too, a number of students were 
shot dead. 
No one, except those who want to save the skins of the 
perpetrators, denies that these were crimes against humanity. 
The campaigners want the charges to go right to the top, to the 
army and police officers who issued the orders for the deadly 
shootings. The names of General Wiranto, who was then 
commander-in-chief of the armed forces and Police General 
Dibyo Widodo, then the national chief of police, have been 
mentioned as the men answerable for these crimes. 
However, in a decision that flew in the face of this legiti-
mate demand, a special committee of the DPR rejected the 
proposal for an ad hoc human rights court to be set up, argu-
ing that they were 'ordinary crimes', and deciae--d to let a 
military court deal with the case. Only three of the parlia-
mentary groups supported the ad hoc court proposal. 
Among the seven groups against were the armed forces and 
police faction and GOLK.AR. 
Major General Syafrie Syamsuddin, Jakarta military commander during the 
riots in May 1998, sitting next to other high officers. So far all these military 
and police officers have managed to escape trial and conviction. 
The committee's report was adopted by 
a plenary session of the DPR on 10 July. 
Relatives of the victims responded 
angrily and President Wahid expressed 
his disappointment by saying that the 
cases 'could not be described as pure 
crimes' since there was 'a political dimen-
sion behind the incidents'. Leading 
human rights NGOs accused parliament 
of harbouring New Order elements who 
will go to any lengths to protect human 
rights perpetrators who in virtually every 
case are serving or retired members of 
the armed forces. Kontras secretary, 
Usman Hamid, described the DPR as 'the 
political whipping boy of TNI and the 
police', while PBHI chairman, Hendardi, 
suggested the legislators 'deserve to be 
called the preservers of impunity who perpet-
uate the policies of the New Order in protect-
ing violators of the law'. [Jakarta Post, 11 
Taken together, these tragedies are seen as having been 
part of a plot by top-ranking military officers to plunge the 
country into chaos and give the military the pretext to 
declare martial law, and crush the wave of protest against 
Suharto. The tide against Suharto was so overwhelming that 
he was forced to relinquish power anyway, but the evil 
consequences of the plot have gone unpunished. 
Nine low-ranking police officers have now gone on trial 
before a military court for shooting the students. The pros-
ecutor accused the men of opening fire 'without orders from 
their superiors', thus blocking any attempt to expose the line 
of command that caused the deaths. 
Thorough investigations of the events have still not taken 
place despite a high-profile campaign by Trisakti students 
July] * 
############################################### 
continuation from page 20 
of torture and ill-treatment inflicted on the prisoners. Their 
other demands include a recommendation to the intema-
tional community to press Indonesia to invite the UN 
experts on extra-judicial killings, torture and the indepen-
dence of judges and lawyers to carry out independent 
assessments of the human rights situation in West Papua. 
The report issued by the two organisations is available at 
www.gn.apc.org/tapol/rO 10706wp.htrn * 
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Police crackdown provokes hail of protest 
A police crackdown against an Asia-Pacific seminar attended by Indonesian and foreign activists 
to discuss neoliberalism and globalisation provoked a hail of protest and accusations that the 
Indonesian police are still wedded to the repressive practices of the Suharto dictatorship. The PRD 
chairperson Budiman Sujatmiko was the clear target in an action also involving right-wing thugs. 
The event that sparked the police crackdown was a three-
day seminar convened by INCREASE, the Indonesian 
Centre for Reform and Social Emancipation. The confer-
ence convened to discuss the theme, Asia-Pacific People's 
Solidarity, It was held at a hotel in Sawangan, Depok, a 
short distance from Jakarta, to bring together activists from 
third world and first world countries to provide a forum for 
discussion on the impact of corporate globalisation on both 
North and South. Along with a number of Indonesian 
activists, there were more than thirty foreign activists 
present, from Australia, New Zealand, the US and Canada, 
as well as from India, Pakistan, Thailand and the 
Philippines. 
Police and thugs collude 
The police operation started on the afternoon of the 
second day, Friday 8 June, but the evening before, suspi-
cions were roused that something might be afoot when 
members of Pemuda Pancasila, an organisation known for 
its hooliganism and closeness to Suharto's New Order 
regime, were seen loitering outside the hotel where the 
seminar was being held. 
At 2pm Friday, the venue was surrounded by 300 heav-
ily-armed police; about a hundred police stormed the hall 
and halted the proceedings, brandishing firearms and 
tear-gas launchers. At first, they said the meeting was 
taking place without a permit but then turned their atten-
tion to the visitors from overseas, alleging that they were 
in breach of the terms of their tourist visas. After demand-
ing to see their passports, the police rounded up the over-
seas visitors along with some of the organisers and drove 
them in an open truck to police headquarters in Jakarta. 
Among the foreign attendees were a French MEP, a 
member of the Auckland city council and a number of 
academics. 
Not long after the police had left, thugs from a right-
wing Islamic youth organisation, Angkatan Muda Ka'bah 
appeared and attacked the remaining Indonesians partici-
pants with swords and other sharp implements. Several 
people were injured in the fray, one of whom needed 
hospitalisation. One of those assaulted was Budiman 
Sujatmiko, chairperson of PRD, the People's Democracy 
Party, who was later taken into police custody overnight. 
The police operation was apparently conducted to remove 
the foreigners and clear the way for a violent physical 
attack on the Indonesians. 
The foreign visitors were held overnight by the police, 
their passports were withheld, they were interrogated and 
threatened with orders to leave the country. For most of 
the foreigners , their local embassies intervened and in 
some cases protested, but the Pakistani participant, 
Farooq Tariq, secretary-general of the Pakistani Labour 
Party, was deported to his country against his will, at the 
request of the Pakistani government, apparently to face 
arrest. 
Budiman, the target 
There is little doubt that the target of this elaborate and 
vicious operate was Budiman Sujatmiko, chair of the PRD 
(People's Democracy Party) who was one of the discussants, 
though his party played no role in organising the event. 
A few weeks before the operation, Indonesia's national 
police chief, Police General Bimantoro said that a number 
of activists, including Budiman, were on his 'hit list' for 
arrest. 
The PRD is part of a coalition called Libas Orba, dedicated 
to exposing the role of Suharto-era, New Order elements 
scheming with politicians to remove President 
Abdurrahman Wahid from power. 
A week before the police operation in Sawangan, the home 
of Budiman's parents was the target of two grenade attacks 
which fortunately did little damage. Days before, Budiman 
had received a phone call warning him that he and his 
family would be targeted. Budiman's parents have always 
been openly supportive of their son's activism ever since he 
was arrested and given a long prison sentence in 1996. 
Democracy in peril 
In a letter to Foreign Minister Alwi Shihab, politicians and 
activists in the UK including Tony Benn, John Pilger, Paul 
Foot, Carmel Budiardjo and Bruce Kent said the police 
actions 'represent a grave threat to Indonesia's infant 
democracy' and called for action against the police officials 
and right-wing thugs responsible for breaking up the 
conference. 
The Jakarta Post wrote in an editorial titled Democracy in 
Peril on 11 June: 'The police and its thug friends have made 
a complete mockery of every value and principle that this 
nation has been struggling to establish in the last three 
years ... With a single stroke, the raid in Sawangan has 
simple turned the clack back on the nation.' 
The PRD said the police had again been used 'as tools to 
repress civilian political activity' and warned that the 'rise of 
remnants of the New Order are clearly in evidence now.' 
TAPOL said in a statement that the police crackdown was 'a 
grim reminder that the methods and attitudes that reigned 
supreme during the hated era of Suharto's New Order are 
still powerful in Indonesia'. * 
14 TAPOL Bulletin No. 162, July/August 2001 
WEST PAPUA 
Mama Yosepha wins environmental award 
Mama Yosepha Alomang, a leader of the Amungme people who has for years stood up to 
Freeport, the company that has relentlessly exploited her people's natural resources, was 
awarded the world's most prestigious environmental award in April. While her battle against 
one of the world's leading corporate predators continues, a major British company, BP, is in 
the early stages of exploiting West Papua's natural gas reserves in another part of the 
resource-rich territory. 
Mama Yosepha was one of eight environmental heroes 
from around the globe to be honoured with the Goldman 
Environmental Prize at a ceremony in San Francisco on 23 
April. The citation says that 'she has organised resistance to 
the destruction of the world's largest gold mine operation, 
set amidst at-risk virgin 
rainforests' . In 1994, 
Mama Yosepha was 
detained during a clam-
pdown by the 
Indonesian army to 
protect the interests of 
the company. During her 
detention, she was held 
for a week in a room 
knee-deep in water and 
human waste, without 
food or drink. She was 
held and tortured for 
altogether six weeks for 
allegedly giving food to 
Mama Yosepha Papuan fighters resisting 
the Indonesian occupation 
and Freeport's land seizures. 
A press release issued to mark the occasion said that 
because she and other leaders continued to speak out fear-
lessly, these and many other abuses became more widely 
known. 'Mama Yosepha has organised her community for 
over 20 years to resist Freeport's destruction and the 
Indonesian government's complacency.' She recently 
created Hamak, the Foundation for Human Rights and 
Against Violence, a women's group dedicated to human 
rights, environmentalism and traditional culture. 
Freeport up its old tricks 
Unable to conceal its embarrassment and irritation at the 
honour bestowed on their most formidable foe, the New 
Orleans-based company announced a few days before the 
award ceremony that it had decided to grant Hamak, her 
women's organisation $248,000, even giving the impression 
that the decision was in response to a request from the 
group. Since the mid-nineties, when protests against the 
company reached a peak, Freeport has pursued a policy of 
trying to buy off the tribal people whose land and ancestral 
sites it has ravaged, hoping in this way to pacify them and 
end organised resistance to the company. The offer of 
money to Hamak was another of the company's tricks, 
trying to share in the glow of recognition given to her. 
The Wall Street Journal (23 April 2001) which described 
Mama Yosepha as among the company's 'most strident foes', 
quoted her as accusing the company of throwing money 
recklessly at the indigenous people of her area. 'The main 
beneficiaries have been corrupt tribal leaders and the mili-
tary, which controls the local houses of gambling, alcohol 
and prostitution,' she is quoted as saying. 'The money is 
killing our people slowly. The company must help us organ-
ise structures to use the money for local development. I give 
the company three or four more years to see if they really 
change. Otherwise, they must leave.' 
Speaking at Freeport's Annual General Meeting in New 
Orleans on 3 May, John Rumbiak, director of ELS-HAM, 
the Institute for the Study of Human Rights and Advocacy, 
also referred to Freeport's attempt to bribe Mama Yosepha, 
and accused the company of manipulation and deception. 
He was scathing about the 1 % fund set up by Freeport 
which had only caused friction and jealousy among the 
different tribal people. An assessment of the work of the 
LPMI, the organisation used by the company to channel the 
money to local communities, had found a great deal of 
corruption, unaccountability, and jealousy amongst the 
recipients. 
Freeport has to stop all its deceitful and deadly games and 
open itself to a thorough investigation on human rights, 
environment, land rights and other problems that implicate 
the company, Rumbiak said. If Freeport wants to continue 
operating in West Papua, it should enter into negotiations 
with the indigenous owners whose mountains and lands 
were being exploited by the company. 
BP to exploit W Papua's natural gas 
Meanwhile a new source of possible conflict is emerging 
in Bintuni Bay, in the area known as Birds'Head. Huge 
reserves of natural gas have attracted the UK's leading 
petroleum company, BP, to develop installations for the 
drilling, liquefaction and export of this commodity. 
Little was known about the development of BP's invest-
ments in Bintuni Bay until a freelance journalist visited the 
area earlier this year. The project will initially involve two 
off-shore platforms with more emerging later as these 
reserves dry up. Marine pipelines will transport the gas to a 
liquefaction plant covering 600 hectares of what is now 
primary rainforest. A nearby fertiliser factory will be built 
by another company, as well as a port to export the LNG. 
Before visiting the BP base camp, the journalist, Keith 
Hyams visited a village on the north side of the Bay to ask 
what villagers felt about the project. Weriagar villagers 
were still angry about the deaths of several dozen babies 
who succumbed to a mysterious disease in 1996, soon after 
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an American company, ARCO (later bought out by BP) 
started drilling for gas in a nearby river which is the vi llage's 
sole source of water. Altogether 48 babies died of the 
disease, Hyams was told. The villagers had planned to 
report the tragedy to the regional government but were 
warned not to do so by military who moved into the area to 
protect the site. They have however filed a demand for 
compensation for the deaths from BP. ARCO also moved 
across the Bay to Ottoweri where 400 hectares of sago trees 
were burnt down without compensation. 
As is so often the case, however, the villagers are tom 
between their anger at the terrible injustices they have 
suffered and a feeling of resignation that the company will 
move in anyway and seeking to get as much as they can out 
of it. Villagers say that BP has promised to fund a health 
clinic and school , provide scholarships for able students and 
help build better housing. One reason they gave for feeling 
more sympathetic towards BP was that the company was at 
least talking to them, unlike other companies in the area. 
West Papuan activists in Manokwari however told Hyams 
that they did not want the British company to come until 
after independence had been achieved. 
As the journalist wrote: 'The bottom line is that the local 
people have no right of veto over the plant and thus only 
minimal control over how they are treated. [The Ecologist, 
June 2001] 
Clearly, villagers now confronting the BP should pay close 
attention to the bitter experiences of the Amungrne and 
other tribal people who have been confronting Freeport and 
their glowing promises for nearly three decades. 
BP and the role of the military 
BP is reported to have decided that it would not use the 
Indonesian armed forces to provide security for its installa-
tions . Whether or not thi s is true, Hyams was told, when he 
met the boss of the BP camp, an American called Jim, that 
a military post was guarding the camp. 
In any case, the authorities in Jayapura are well aware that 
the recent events in Wasior, some 60 kms to the east, have a 
direct bearing on the prospects of British investments in 
Bintuni Bay. The governor of Irian Jaya, loop Salossa, a 
retired armed officer who formerly held the post of deputy 
governor of East Timor (where the governor was always a 
non-military East Timorese and his deputy was always a 
retired army officer), stressed that the provincial govern-
ment's support for the LNG project would continue regard-
less of the recent disturbances in Warior. He said he had 
asked the security forces to 'secure the region, particularly 
in the vicinity of Bintuni Bay, so as to make sure that the 
LNG project can proceed.' 
'The Bintuni Bay LNG project will be second only to 
Freeport in Timika as an economic asset,' he said. 'I very 
much hope there will be no repetition of the events in 
Wasior. But the most crucial thing is that those events 
should not stand in the way of the LNG project. I have 
therefore asked the chief of police and the military 
commander to assist the local government in providing 
security to the LNG project. Security is the top priority for 
the LNG project.' [Cendrawasih Pos, 19 June 2001] 
###################################################################################-##################### 
Brimob violence engulfs Manokwari 
Widespread police operations have been underway since March this year in the district of 
Manokwari in the Bird's Head region of West Papua, following armed attacks on two logging 
companies. In the second of these incidents,five Brimob officers were killed. Retribution against 
the population has led to many civilian casualties and thousands of villagers fleeing to nearby 
forests. The area has been sealed off as sweepings continue undetected by outside observers. 
Events in Manokwari district have been a matter 
of deep concern for human rights organisations in 
West Papua and church activists from the OKI, 
because of the intensity of sweepings and operations 
conducted since April by the police force, backed up 
by the notorious crack police unit, Brimob and the 
Indonesian army, TNI. 
The intensity of the response by the security forces 
is also related to plans by the British petroleum 
company, BP, to exploit huge gas reserves in and 
around Bintuni Bay which lies close by, to the west 
of Manokwari district. The governor of Irian Jaya, 
Salossa, has warned that security disturbances in 
Manokwari must not be allowed to obstruct the 
progress of the BP project. [Cendrawasih Pos, 19 June] 
(See separate article.) 
Dispute with logging company 
Earlier this year, local people were in dispute with one 
of the many logging companies operating in the sub-
district of Wasior in the southern part of Manokwari 
district over unsatisfactory compensation for their trees 
and ancestral land taken over by the concessionaire. 
Then, on 31 March, the base camp of the company, PT 
Dharma Mukti Persada (DMP), was attacked by an 
armed gang and three company employees were killed. 
Although this was almost certainly the work of a unit of 
the OPM's armed wing, the TPN, the security forces 
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used the incident as the justification for bolstering their 
presence in the area, sending in reinforcements from the 
notorious crack force of the police, Brimob. 
As so often happens, the local population bore the brunt 
of the crackdown. The police conducted sweepings in the 
area, entered villages and started shooting. Hundreds of 
terrified villagers fled into the forests, to avoid more acts of 
violence and intimidation. Alarming reports began to reach 
human rights groups in Jayapura about the catastrophe 
unfolding in Wasior. 
Since most of the inhabitants in Wasior sub-district are 
members of 
the GKI, 
one of the 
leading 
Protestant 
churches in 
West Papua, 
the church 
decided to 
set up a 
Pastoral 
Team to go 
The two Belgian hostages in the bush and investigate 
the alarming 
developments and do what they could to give succour to 
their flock. However, the local police chief refused to allow 
the Team to enter the sub-district and it was forced to return 
to Jayapura. 
In late April, a group of 22 villagers from Nabire, which 
lies to the east, set out on a journey to visit a sacred site in 
Wasior. On their way home about ten days later, they were 
intercepted by a unit of Brimob troops who opened fire for 
no apparent reason as the group had shown no signs of 
wanting to resist the troops. Six of the men were shot dead 
and the other 16 who survived by taking shelter in the hold 
of a vessel which was to have taken them back home by sea, 
were all arrested. The detainees were beaten and tortured as 
they were being transported to the town of Manokwari, in 
the north. The two most gravely wounded detainees were 
transferred to a hospital in Jayapura while the other fourteen 
have been held in detention in Manokwari. 
Flag-raising incident 
Yet another incident occurred when the security forces in 
Manokwari town pulled down the Morning Star, the West 
Papuan flag, which had been unfurled on 1 May in the 
grounds of the home of the local Papuan leader, Bernadus 
Mandachan. The troops opened fire on the flag-raisers when 
they refused to lower the flag, injuring seven men and 
arresting twenty. Two of the five who have been held in 
detention are likely to face charges, along with others whom 
the police suspect of being involved in the flag-raising. 
Brimob members killed 
As the sweepings continued in Wasior sub-district, another 
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logging company was the target of an armed attack on 13 
June. Five Brimob members and a company employee were 
killed. These Brimob troops had been brought into the area 
after the attack on 31 March to provide greater protection to 
logging company premises. 
When members of the security forces are slain, the fury 
of their officers knows no bounds and Wasior has become 
the target of yet more operations, sweepings and intimida-
tion. An even larger area has been sealed off, stretching in 
the south from Fak-Fak in the west to Nabire in the east. A 
number of people living in the vicinity of the logging 
company have been rounded up and transported to 
Manokwari to be interrogated about the 13 June incident. 
The security forces have also appointed informers in all the 
villages, under orders to produce the men who killed the 
Brimob officers. 
To make matters worse, two Belgian television journalists 
disappeared in Puncak Jaya, to the south of Wasior. It soon 
became apparent that they had been abducted by a local OPM 
group and the Belgian authorities became involved in nego-
tiations to secure the men's release. As we went to press, it 
was announced that two church leaders had agreed to negoti-
ate with the abductors to secure their release. 
Human rights activists are facing tremendous problems 
responding to the situation in Manokwari district. Lawyers 
sent from Jayapura to assist the many people now in deten-
tion there have been hampered in their work and their lives 
even threatened by police officers, in total disregard of the 
right of detainees to have the assistance of legal counsel 
during interrogation. A human rights volunteer working in 
Nabire who had drawn attention to a number of mysterious 
murders in the town, was summoned for interrogation by 
the police in a clear attempt to hamper his investigations. 
This was how the police responded to a plea from ELS-
HAM to the police to investigate the killings. 
The terrible retribution being visited on the population of 
Wasior is bound to have dire consequences for economic and 
social conditions, especially if villagers are forced to aban-
don their villages for any length of time and are prevented 
from tending their gardens or hunting and fishing. This could 
replicate the disastrous events that overcame villagers in 
Timika, in the south of West Papua in 1996, when the secu-
rity forces imposed a clampdown, following the release of 
four British scientists who had been held captive by the OPM 
for five months. Later investigations revealed that more than 
two hundred villagers died, mostly of starvation and lack of 
medical care, after abandoning their homes. [See TAPOL 
Bulletin, No 144, December 1997] 
If these security measures continue unabated, the people 
of Wasior and the Manokwari district are likely to have a 
very hard time for months to come, while more trials can be 
expected to take place. * 
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Rights commission accuses police in Papua 
A damning report about police crimes against humanity in West Papua has been produced 
by Indonesia's human rights commission. However, injustices against West Papuans 
arrested and tried for flag-raising continue unabated. 
Twenty-five police officers have been named as suspects 
in a report drawn up by the National Human Rights 
Commission (Komnas HAM) following investigations into 
an attack on students in Abepura, West Papua last 
December. 'This case constitutes a gross violation of human 
rights and should be prosecuted under the rights' tribunal 
law rather than under the Criminal Code,' said Albert 
Hasibuan who headed the Commission's investigation team 
sent to Jayapura in February this year. 
The police raided three student dormitories in Abepura on 
7 December 2000 after an attack by unidentified persons on 
a police station in Jayapura, without having a shred of 
evidence that the students were responsible for the attack. 
The police were intent on pinning the incident on highlanders 
from Wamena. One police officer was killed in the attack. 
The subsequent atrocities gained international attention 
because a Swiss journalist who had been arrested by the 
police for allegedly abusing his tourist visa witnessed what 
happened in the detention centre where he was held. [See 
TAPOL Bulletin, No 161, March-April 2001, page 20] 
The police raided three dormitories accommodating 
Cendrawasih University students in Abepura, on the 
outskirts of Jayapura, and three residential complexes 
mostly occupied by people from Wamena, according to the 
inquiry. The incident claimed the lives of three persons, two 
of whom died while in police custody, while the third died 
after being shot in the head as he was being arrested. 
According to the investigation team, two others have 
suffered permanent physical injuries. [For a detailed 
account of the Abepura incident, see 'Violence and Political 
Impasse in Papua', Human Rights Watch, July 2001] 
The Komnas HAM inquiry grouped the perpetrators into 
three categories: those who conducted the arrests and 
abused the prisoners, those who were responsible for the 
operation, and those who were responsible for order and 
security in Jayapura. The first category involves 21 police 
officers and members of Brimob, the elite police brigade. 
The other four suspects are high-ranking police officers in 
Irian Jaya who should be held responsible for the incident as 
they were in command. [The Jakarta Post, 18 May 2001] 
According to the Australian Financial Review [19 May 
2001], the report named the province's police chief, 
Brigadier-General Sylvanus Wenas, his deputy, Brigadier-
General Moersoetidamo Moerhadi, Brimob commander 
Senior Superintendent Johny Wainal Usman and Jayapura 
commander Superintendent Daud Sihombing, and calls for 
them to be prosecuted along with the lower ranks who were 
directly involved. 
Police exert pressure on witnesses 
The Komnas HAM investigations did not run smoothly as 
the local police and civil authorities tried to scupper the 
mission by summoning witnesses after they had been inter-
viewed by the Komnas HAM team. Hasibuan con~emned 
this as an 'obstruction to justice ... because the witnesses 
and victims were scared and felt intimidated since the police 
often visited their residences'. Ironically, there was also 
interference from the Jayapura office of the justice and 
human rights ministry which, instead of supporting the 
Commission's investigations, advised the local police not to 
respond to the investigation team's summons since the 
office regarded the Abepura incident as 'an ordinary crime' 
and therefore outside the Commission's mandate. [The 
Jakarta Post, 24 March 2001] 
Pro-independence demonstration of Papuans in Jakarta 
Following their investigations, the Komnas HAM team 
submitted their findings to the Attorney General whose task it 
is to decide whether prosecutions should follow, in which case 
the trials will take place before a human rights court which 
will sit in Makassar, South Sulawesi. This will be a significant 
event, the first case to come before the Human Rights Court 
set up under the Human Rights Court Law of November 2000. 
On 18 June, the new attorney general, Baharuddin Lopa (who 
died two weeks later), appointed a team of more than thirty 
prosecutors to study the findings and report to him within 
thirty days about proceeding to the next stage. 
Meeting ends in walk-out and killing 
A meeting convened by the authorities to discuss a 
proposal for 'special autonomy' for West Papua ended in 
everyone present walking out in disgust at the proposal. One 
man was shot dead and 13 people were arrested by security 
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forces trying to control the crowds, as more and more 
people walked out of the meeting. 
One of the participants, Dr Keleili, who worked for 20 
years as an assistant to Indonesian-appointed governors, 
said that hundreds of West Papuans from all the 14 districts, 
attended the autonomy seminar, held in Jayapura on 28 
March 2000. The meeting was inaugurated by Joop Salossa, 
the governor of Irian Jaya province. The participants 
included government officials, representatives of women's 
groups, and traditional leaders. On the agenda was a request 
from Jakarta for West Papuans to put forward what they 
wanted in the way of special autonomy. 
But the West Papuan delegates wanted to discuss quite a 
different agenda, independence. Suddenly, one by one each 
delegation stood up, announced that they rejected the auton-
omy offer and walked out of the meeting where they joined 
a crowd of more than 3,000 outside, chanting 'indepen-
dence, not autonomy'. 
Then several truckloads of students arrived and tried to 
restrain the police who were becoming increasingly violent. 
But the police opened fire and started wielding batons and 
iron rods; a highlander, Philipus Murib, (30 years old) who 
had been a delegate at the meeting, was struck in the stom-
ach. He was rushed to hospital where he died, despite 
attempts by doctors to save him with a three-hour operation. 
Seven other civilians were injured. Thirteen students were 
arrested. [Australian Broadcasting Corporation Asia-
Pacific Report, 30 March 2001] 
Fak-Fak trial, a gross abuse 
Meanwhile, five West Papuans who were arrested in Fak-
Fak last December after trying to protect their West Papuan 
flag from being pulled down by the police were convicted in 
a court and sentenced to one and a half years each on 20 
May 2001. 
The five men, Izak Baho (54), Lukas Tenau (42), Dance 
Iek (51), Azer Sagas (24) and Lukas Iha (22) were arrested 
on 1 December last year when police attacked a group of 
forty people in the village of Brongkedik who had raised the 
Morning Star flag. Two men, Evelinus Krispul and 
Fahruddin Hindom, both aged 20, were shot dead when the 
security forces opened fire on the group. Two others were 
wounded, Gerson Hindom and Esau Woy. 
During the early period of their detention, they were 
subjected to violence; they were struck with rifle-butts, 
kicked and beaten till their bodies were covered in swellings 
and bruises. Lukas Iha sustained heavy blows on the head 
and is still suffering from damage to the brain. No attempt 
was made to provide the men with medical treatment. 
The trial, which opened on 26 April was not open to the 
public, in violation of the procedural code. They were charged 
under Emergency Law No 12/19 51 for being in possession of 
dangerous weapons without permission. (These were almost 
certainly traditional weapons carried by West Papuans in 
conformity with their customs.) In a trial that, according to the 
human rights NGO, ELS-HAM, contravened virtual every 
rule in the book, the men had no defence lawyers, were not 
allowed to call defence witnesses or permitted to present a 
defence plea. Because the trial was closed to the public, even 
their relatives were not able to attend. 
PPC leaders go on trial 
The first hearings of the long-awaited trials of five lead-
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ers of the Papuan Presidium Council have now started in 
Jayapura. The first to go on trial was the PPC chair, Theys 
Eluay, who was charged with rebellion, under article 106 of 
the Criminal Code, which carries a maximum penalty of 20 
years. He is also charged under Article 154, one of the hate-
sowing charges, for which the penalty is seven years. His 
trial was immediately followed by that of Don Flossy, a 
member of the Council . The three others, who are to be 
tried jointly, are the Reverend Herman Awom, Thaha Al 
Hamid and John Mambor. Their trial has been delayed 
because of the ill-health of John Mambor. 
In their first statement to the court, Eluay and his lawyers 
said the aim of the Papuan struggle was no longer to create 
an independent state - because they have that already - but 
to retrieve their rights to sovereignty. His lawyer, Siregar, 
told the court that the May 2000 Papua Congress, which 
concluded by demanding that Jakarta recognise the 
province's sovereignty, could not be considered subversive, 
as it was held with the agreement of local government, mili-
tary and police chiefs, all of whom attended. 
'We told them that the Congress results were not just the 
aspirations of the five defendants but of the entire Papua 
community,' Siregar told journalists, after the hearing. 
'So what Theys did was to express political aspirations. That 
doesn't constitute mobilising a political rebellion or 
subversion.' 
The trial of Don Flassy, also facing the charge of rebel-
lion, went ahead in Jayapura on 2 July after the court 
rejected a motion by the defence challenging the legitimacy 
of the court. He is accused among other things of attending 
a declaration at the home of Theys Eluay, of being present 
at a flag-raising ceremony on 1 December 1999, of being 
coordinator of the drafting committees of the Papuan 
Congress in February 2000 and the Second Papuan National 
Congress in May-June 2000. [Kompas, 2 July 2001] 
Four students trial drags on in Jakarta 
Four West Papuan students who took part in a pro-inde-
pendence demonstration in Jakarta, along with scores of 
others, have been on trial since 15 March. [See TAPOL 
Bulletin No 161, March/April 2001, page 16] 
Although they originally faced the charge of rebellion, 
under article 106 of the Criminal Code, that has now been 
dropped. While the charge they now face is the lesser one of 
'hate-sowing', they have needlessly suffered months of 
abuse, detention in a police cell and in prison. By rights they 
should be entitled to sue the police for wrongful arrest. 
In his summing up, the prosecutor asked the court to find 
them guilty under the 'hate-sowing' Article 154 and asked 
for an eight-month sentence. While the trial was in progress, 
their detention order was suspended and they were allowed 
to leave prison. A defence plea on their behalf was sched-
uled for 17 July. 
The four men are Matius Rumbrapuk (31 ), graduate, 
Satyawacana University, Salatiga, Central Java, Laon 
Wenda (28), a student at FISIP Universitas Jenderal 
Achrnad Yani, Ciamis, West Java, Joseph Wenda, (23), a 
student at the Theological College, Jakarta, and Hans 
Gabay, (22), a student at Universitas Proklamasi 45, 
Yogyakarta, Central Java. * 
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Wamena political prisoners campaign 
TAPOL joined forces in July with its partner organisation in West Papua, ELS-!fAM, the 
Institute for Human Rights Study and Advocacy, to produce a report on the appall~ng a~u_ses 
suffered by a group of 22 prisoners detained in Wamena, West Papu~ fo! their political 
beliefs and their support for independence for West Papua. The organisations launch~d a 
campaign demanding the release of the prisoners and investigations into the human right 
violations committed by State officials 
The report - Criminalising politics in West Papua: The 
trials of 22 Wamena political prisoners and their abuse by 
the police - lists a catalogue of abuses suffered by the pris-
oners while in detention and on trial, including torture and 
other forms of ill-treatment, and a death in custody. It 
reveals that the police and judicial authorities committed 
flagrant breaches of Indonesian law and international stan-
dards applicable to detention and the right to a fair trial. 
The report casts serious doubt on the independence and 
impartiality of the trial judges. 
Scapegoats for 'Bloody Wamena' 
The 22 prisoners were arrested during and following a 
series of highly provocative operations by the Indonesian 
police in and around Wamena on 6 October 2000, which 
began when the police pulled down a number of 'Morning 
Star' West Papuan flags and brutally assaulted the flag-rais-
ers. The tragic events in Wamena that day became known as 
'Bloody Wamena'. They resulted in the killing of 13 
Papuans by the police and the subsequent killing of two 
dozen migrants seen as being in collusion with the police. 
[see TAPOL Bulletin No. 161 , p. 18] 
The prisoners include five Panel (local representative) 
members of the pro-independence Papuan Presidium 
Council and 17 others . Thirteen of the 17 are members of 
the local Satgas Papua (Papuan Taskforce), one is a govern-
ment employee and three are members of the public caught 
up by chance in the incidents for which the Satgas Papua 
members were arrested. 
In January and February 2001, the prisoners were all 
found guilty of rebellion or attempting to separate part of 
the State of Indonesia and other lesser offences and were 
sentenced to terms of imprisonment ranging from one to 
four-and-a-half years. On 12 June 2001 they filed an appeal 
at the Indonesian Supreme Court. Their earlier appeal to the 
Wamena High Court was dismissed. 
The 17 were convicted for exercising of their right to free-
dom of expression and assembly by unfurling the 'Morning 
Star' flag, despite the fact the authorities had given permis-
sion for the flag to be flown until 19 October 2000. The five 
Panel members were convicted in relation to their member-
ship of the Presidium Council and their actions in dissemi-
nating the decisions of the Papuan Consultation meeting in 
February 2000 and the Second Papuan People's Congress in 
May-June 2000, which led to the founding of the Presidium 
Council [see TAPOL Bulletin no. 158, p. 17]. This despite 
the fact that the Congress was substantially funded by 
President Wahid. 
It is clear that the prisoners were targeted for their politi-
cal beliefs. Although no evidence could be found of their 
involvement in or responsibility for Bloody Wamena, they 
were made the scapegoats for that tragedy because of their 
support for independence for West Papua.. . . 
Their treatment is in stark contrast to the 1mpumty en Joyed 
by the police and state officials who tortured and brutalised 
them. 
A new generation of political prisoners 
The treatment of the Wamena prisoners is part of a 
concerted campaign by the Indonesian authorities to 
suppress legitimate independence aspirations, which has 
intensified since the recent deployment of additional secu-
rity forces to the West Papua. The TAPOL/ELS-HAM 
report shows that little has changed since the dark days of 
the Suharto regime: 
"In Indonesia, supremacy of the law has for decades been 
overridden by the political interests of the state, particularly 
in places such as West Papua where the demand for self-
determination is strong. This remains true three years after 
the fall of the Suharto and the coming to power of a demo-
cratically-elected president twenty months ago." 
Soon after it took office, the Wahid government released 
all remaining political prisoners indicating that the deten-
tion and conviction of people for involvement in political 
activities would have no place in the post-Suharto 
Indonesia. The Government has now reversed that policy 
and is creating a new generation of political prisoners. 
It is likely that a similar fate awaits five other members of 
the Presidium Council, including its leader, Theys Eluay -
also charged with rebellion - and four students in Jakarta 
charged under Indonesia's notorious 'hate sowing' articles 
with expressing hostility, hatred and contempt of the 
Government. 
Five other pro-independence activists from the town of 
Fak-Fak are in prison and victims of arbitrary detention 
following a grossly unfair trial for weapons offences, which 
involved serious breaches of Indonesian law and interna-
tional standards [see separate item]. 
Recommendations 
TAPOL and ELS-HAM are calling upon the Indonesian 
authorities to release the 22 prisoners immediately and 
unconditionally, to investigate and bring to justice those 
responsible for the violence and killings which resulted in 
Bloody Wamena, and to investigate and bring to justice 
those responsible for the death in custody and the acts of 
continued on page 13 
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Refugee registration a sham 
On 6 and 7 June, the Indonesian government went ahead with controversial plans to register East 
Timorese refugees in West Timor and determine whether they wished to remain in Indonesia or 
return to East Timor. With militias still in control of the refugee camps and security conditions 
preventing the direct involvement of the international community, the process was a dangerous 
sham which has done nothing to contribute to the safe repatriation or re-settlement of the refugees. 
The final figures for the registration showed that 295,751 
refugees were registered of which 113,794 were over the 
age of 17 years. Of those over 17, 98.02 per cent opted to 
remain in Indonesia. These figures - both for the total 
number of refugees and the proportion wishing to remain in 
Indonesia - are far too high and clearly do not reflect the 
refugees' real wishes and long-term intentions. Local 
NGOs estimate that around 65 per cent of the refugees 
would prefer to return to East Timor at some stage. 
The fact that the international community 
allowed the Indonesian government to go ahead 
with the registration is highly regrettable. Serious 
questions have to be asked about why the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) funded 
almost half the costs (using money provided by the 
European Union) and why the UN Transitional 
Administration for East Timor (UNTAET) and the 
International Organisation for Migration (IOM) 
lent credibility to the process by sending observers. 
Their involvement begs the question as to who will 
challenge the Indonesian authorities' handling of 
the refugee crisis and who is actually looking after 
the interests of the refugees. Almost two years 
after the East Timorese were forced into West 
Timor, it appears that the answer is nobody. 
International diplomatic and media attention on 
tration process it conducted was deeply flawed. In particu-
lar, it did not address the rampant militia intimidation, 
corruption and aggression that would prevent the refugees 
making a free and informed choice. 
In November 2000, a UN Security Council mission to East 
Timor recommended that a team of experts should assess 
the security situation in West Timor and that the registration 
process should not start until the team had verified that it 
could be carried out safely. That security assessment was 
the refugee crisis has waxed and waned since . . . . . 
S b 1999 h 250 000 E t T. Small monument m Suai to commemorate the mass killings m 1998 by eptem er w en over , as 1morese .1.. T'NI d n 1. fi were forcibly driven to West Timor following the post- mt itia, an .ro ice orces. 
ballot violence in East Timor. There was some renewal of only started on 8 July, after the registration was completed. 
interest after the murder of three UNHCR workers in The official participation of organisations such as UNTAS 
Atambua, West Timor in September 2000, which resulted in (a pro-integration political organisation associated with the 
the withdrawal of all international aid organisations and UN militias) in publicising the registration undermined the 
agencies. However, consistent and significant lobbying on neutrality of the process and should have been prohibited at 
behalf of the refugees has never materialised in either an all stages. The fact that the actual outcome almost matched 
international or East Timorese context. an UNTAS prediction that 95 per cent of refugees would 
Ironically, more international outrage was expressed over indicate a wish to remain in Indonesia is a clear indication 
the light sentences handed out to those charged in connec- that the whole process was tightly controlled by the pro-
tion with the UNHCR killings than was expressed over the Indonesia forces. 
plight of the tens of thousands of refugees who had been The criterion that refugees had to register with their 'heads 
without significant humanitarian assistance for nine of families' nullified any illusion that the process would 
months. Never mind the fact that there has been no justice provide a comprehensive and accurate survey of refugees' 
for the West Timorese also killed by militia in and around intentions, bearing in mind that the majority of families in 
Atambua at the time of the UNHCR killings. West Timor are headed by males, who are either militia or 
Indonesia presses ahead regardless 
In this vacuum of international concern, the Indonesian 
government forged ahead with its own solution to the prob-
lem with very little resistance from any quarter. The regis-
associated with the Indonesian military (TNI) or under their 
influence. Many refugees were swept into West Timor from 
villages dominated by militia leaders and are still helplessly 
under the authority of those leaders. Whole families and 
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communities would have had no option but to register accord-
ing to the dictates of the militias or face violent retribution. 
Only 12 international observers were present to cover 507 
registration stations, 1,600 registration officials, 80 field 
supervisors and no less than 4,504 security personnel from 
the TNI and police. Even if the proposed number of 34 inter-
national observers had arrived and participated, they would 
never have had the capacity to comprehensively monitor the 
entire process. Several local NGOs with long experience of 
dealing with the refugee crisis were not given accreditation. 
The fact that in the event the registration on 6 and 7 June 
was conducted in an orderly fashion and without any overt 
displays of violence or intimidation is largely irrelevant. 
The power and influence of the militias is far more insidi-
ous and operates at various levels above and below the 
surface. As the relative calm of the August 1999 East Timor 
ballot day demonstrated, the military and militias are able to 
turn the violence off and on at will. The atmosphere on the 
registration days says nothing about prior or subsequent 
intimidation and violence, which would have had a 
profound influence on the refugees' decisions. 
In stating that the "people had been able to express their 
wishes freely without fear, threat or intimidation" [see 
OCHA Consolidated Situation Report for Indonesia, No. 29 
for 15 - 22 June 2001], UNTAET and IOM were at best 
extremely na"ive and at worst complicit in the violation of 
the refugees' rights. 
The report of the international observers - including 
UNTAET and IOM - is a disgraceful cop-out. Incredibly, 
the word 'militia' is not used once throughout the entire six-
page report. In a perversion of language, the observers 
prefer to use the term 'refugee community leader'. There is 
no reference to the general security situation in West Timor 
and its impact on the process. The observers were more 
concerned with technical issues such as whether the regis-
tration started on time and whether proper ink marking was 
used. The only worthwhile outcome of the mission was the 
finding that 'the ballot should be viewed as a choice made 
by the refugees on the day, and not necessarily as an indica-
tion of their permanent intentions'. 
A rushed and deeply-flawed process 
The process was driven in part by the wish to complete the 
registration and repatriation in time for refugees to register 
for the East Timorese elections on 30 August 2001. That 
may have been a laudable objective, but the overriding 
objective of the process should have been to ensure that the 
refugees were able to make a free and informed choice 
about where they wished to live. The Indonesian authorities 
should not have been permitted to impose a timetable for 
registration unrelated to the situation on the ground in West 
Timor. If anything, the East Timorese authorities should 
have considered postponing the elections until conditions in 
West Timor allowed for the registration, repatriation and re-
settlement of the refugees according to international stan-
dards for the protection of refugees . 
Apart from the major problem of militia violence and 
intimidation, the process was seriously flawed in failing to 
take account of the complexities of the refugees' circum-
stances and intentions. 
Frank Brennan, Country Director of the Jesuit Refugee 
Service in East Timor wrote to Sergio de Mello, the head of 
UNTAET two months before the registration saying: 'Asking 
the simple question whether people 'wish to re~urn to E~s~ 
Timor or whether they wish to settle permanently m Indonesia 
will provide little guidance about people's real intentions.' 
After the registration, he said: 'It is impossible to read any 
sense into the result of such a simplistic survey conducted 
with inadequate public education and security.' He pointed 
out that many refugees actually wanted to wait and see wh_at 
happens after the elections in East Timor. Others were still 
awaiting assurances regarding their homes and land .. Some 
who wish to settle in Indonesia want to do so only 1f they 
can stay in West Timor; others want to stay so long as their 
salaries are paid by the Indonesian authorities. He went on: 
'Most East Timorese want to return home eventually. Most 
of those still in the camps want to stay in West Timor in the 
foreseeable future. We all knew that before the registration. 
The registration results will now be used by the Government 
of Indonesia, UNHCR and UNTAET to rationalise the 
abandonment of the majority of the people left in the camps 
on the basis that they have exercised a choice to stay. 
UNHCR described this registration as 'a necessary first step 
towards identifying and promoting durable solutions for 
East Tim or refugees . .. '. It was nothing of the sort. It was 
a further step backwards after the international community's 
departure in September 2000 and will now be used as a step 
along the way of UNHCR's withdrawal from Timor before 
these people have pursued their preferred durable solution. 
'Any registration of intention (to remain or return) in camps 
as insecure as those in West Timor is dangerous and impru-
dent unless the anonymity of the registrants can be assured. 
Even if anonymity be assured, there is a need for transparent, 
independent socialisation about the process, none of which 
was in evidence when I visited camps around Atambua two 
weeks before the registration. The international community 
should not have given any endorsement (let alone paid for) a 
registration process which could proceed in a closed envi-
ronment where militia leaders and their political masters 
enjoy a campaign monopoly without independent scrutiny. 
In one camp, even I was seen as an apologist for UNTAET 
because I was giving both sides of the story. 
There was little public understanding in the camps about 
the purpose or nature of the registration process. And yet 
UNHCR covered half the costs ... UNHCR would never 
have conducted such a process itself in camps where it had 
open and secure access. Pragmatism dictated the funding of 
a flawed process' [Frank Brennan SJ, 'Bridging Diverse 
Issues and Converging Interests in the West Pacific', The 
Australian Studies Centre University of Indonesia 
International Seminar, Jakarta, 13 June 2001]. 
Confusion was also caused by the fact that the registration 
was publicised by many people - including the Indonesian 
task force responsible for its administration - as a vote. The 
outcome was described as the 'result' and those who failed to 
indicate their intentions were said to have 'abstained'. Dis-
information was spread by some militia that this was a re-run 
of the 1999 ballot in East Timor; the intention being to scare 
people into 'voting' to stay in Indonesia in order to avoid a 
reprise of the 1999 violence and devastation. 
The outcome of the process was also seriously distorted 
by people registering in more than one place and non-
refugees registering in order to obtain food and aid from the 
Indonesian government. This explains the high figure for 
the total number of refugees. 
The government's budget for the registration included 
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plans for an extensive TV and print media socialisation 
campaign, registration of refugees outside of West Timor, 
try out registration runs in Tuapukan and Haliwen camps 
and money for indelible ink to be used on registration day. 
None of this was done and UNHCR must hold the govern-
ment properly to account for the expenditure of the money 
it was given. 
International community must now act 
It is now incumbent on the international community to 
hold the 
Indonesian 
Government to 
account for all its 
decisions regard-
ing the refugees 
and the results of 
the registration. 
Once re-settle-
m e n t 
commences, it 
will be much 
harder to monitor 
the ongoing 
welfare of the 
refugees especially 
if they are taken to other parts of Indonesia against their 
will. There is increasing concern about what has happened 
to those who opted to return to East Timor. 
If the Indonesian government has neither the means nor the 
will to proceed with the re-settlement and repatriation then 
all other efforts must continue to ensure freedom of choice 
for all those who remain in West Timor. The myriad of 
reasons for the ongoing refugee problem remain and must 
be addressed. 
There are signs that Jakarta wants to deal with the crisis, 
but is powerless to confront the militias who are holding the 
upper hand. The Indonesian Government is also unable to 
confront the problem of disgruntled TNI elements, which 
refuse to accept the loss of East Timor and are determined 
to prolong the refugee crisis as a source of instability and 
possible means of revenge against the East Timorese. In 
April, the OCHA stated: 'TNI spokesman Rear Marshal 
Graito Usodo said that a certain elite group is still attempt-
ing to motivate former militiamen of the pro-integration 
group to reoccupy East Timor. He did not elaborate.' 
[OCHA report No. 20, 20 April 2001] 
While the militias and TNI elements are succeeding in 
their long-term objective of keeping the refugees in the 
camps, the Government appears to be concerned about the 
social and economic consequences of large numbers of 
refugees remaining in Indonesia. Security minister, Agum 
Gumelar has said that he hopes tens of thousands of the East 
Timorese refugees will return home [Jakarta Post, 21 June 
2001], while minister of resettlement and infrastructure, 
Erna Witoelar, has admitted that Indonesia is unable to 
shoulder the burden of all the refugees who have said they 
want to stay [Jakarta Post, 18 June 2001]. The Governor of 
East N usa Tenggara province, which includes West Timor, 
said that the province could accommodate only 6,000 
refugees [OCHA, 15 - 22 June 2001]. 
Indonesia also has to cope with the massive problem of an 
estimated 1.25 million internally displaced persons in other 
WESTTIMOR 
provinces, such as Maluku [Jakarta Post, 12 July]. 
The problem of salaries and pensions remains an issue that 
affects up to 20,000 East Timorese refugees in West Timor. 
Negotiations during bilateral talks held in Denpasar, Bali in 
May between UNTAET and the Indonesian government 
made some progress regarding a planned severance or 
compensation fund for former state employees. In this 
connection, a consolidated appeal for West Timor refugees 
will probably be launched by Indonesia and the United 
Nations in July. However, a timetable for the scheme needs 
to be clearly defined and implemented as soon as possible. 
Continuing disinformation regarding the security situation 
in East Timor and general confusion about the upcoming 
election and predicted violence are still major factors for 
non-return. Contact with family members and friends who 
have already returned to East Timor remains the most 
trusted manner in which refugees receive reliable informa-
tion. 'Border Reunions' should be restarted in order for 
information from both sides of the border to be dissemi-
nated from and to communities who trust one another in the 
same manner that 'Go and See' visits and/or border meetings 
should be instigated at a grassroots level. A community 
approach to reconciliation and reintegration will be a much 
more effective way of fostering trust and successful return. 
Some local and international NGOs have been carrying out 
effective work in this area but do not have the capacity to 
bear this burden in full. 
In this respect, there must be a more co-ordinated approach 
to reconciliation. High level delegations and visits do not 
impact at the grassroots level and can lead to more confu-
sion and distrust amongst the ordinary refugee population. 
Reconciliation talks with militia leaders, although impor-
tant for the future stability of East Timor, do nothing to 
encourage refugee return. They merely consolidate and 
legitimise the power militia leaders have in the refugee 
camps and increase the distrust refugees have of the UN, 
whom they see negotiating with the very people keeping 
them in West Timor. 
UNTAET and the East Timorese leadership must take 
affirmative action to ensure the best possible conditions for 
return. Although foreign minister, Jose Ramos-Horta, 
publicly criticised the registration process as "an absolute 
farce" [AP, 8 June 2001], it is time for more than words. 
Motivated by financial and some international pressure, the 
Indonesia government has been the only body to take deci-
sive action on the refugee problem in the last nine months; 
the registration being its solution. Not one of East Timor's 
new political parties has spoken about the potential refugee 
voters who are not being allowed the opportunity to partic-
ipate in their country's future. If neither the international 
community nor the East Timorese show an interest, then 
who will hold the Indonesian government to account? If 
tens of thousands of refugees are forcibly resettled to other 
parts of Indonesia, who will take responsibility for their 
plight? Judging from recent history on West Timor, the 
answer, again, is nobody. * 
Just Out: 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND THE ENVI-
RONMENT IN EAST TIMOR, JULY 2001, 135 PP 
Puhl: Timor Aid, Inform.: cdeutsch@met7,.une.edu.au 
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Massacre by TNI in Ambon 
On 14 June, a special battalion YON GAB (Batalyon Gabungan, Joint Battalion) stormed the ~ead­
quarters of Laskar Jihad, the Muslim militia, in Kebon Cengkih on the island of Ambon. Using a 
huge force of heavily-armed troops, the elite unit killed at least 20 people and wound~d anoth~~ 40. 
Soon after the massacre, Brig. General I Made Yasa, who commanded the regional military 
command, was withdrawn and appointed director of Secapa, the cadet school for army officers. 
The June incident looked very much like a replica of the 
killings in March when an operation by Yon Gab inflicted 
heavy casualties on Laskar Jihad. On that occasion, several 
key officers from the police and army were captured, fight-
ing on the Muslim side. 
Prior to the military operation on 14 June, the predomi-
nantly Christian Wisma Gonzalo area was attacked by an 
armed group for two days running, resulting in five deaths. 
Prior to the first action against the Laskar Jihad, Agus 
Wattimena, the militia leader of the Christian Laskar Kristus, 
was killed by a professional gunman with a bullet in the head. 
These ruthless actions by Indonesia's best troops raise a 
crucial question: why is the TNI suddenly so serious about 
ending the prolonged conflict that has cost thousands of 
lives and turned hundreds of thousands of people into 
refugees? It is a public secret that TNI soldiers and units 
have been fighting on both sides of the conflict with plenty 
of evidence of highly-placed officers in Jakarta fanning this 
so-called Christian-Muslim conflict. 
Yon Gab, a special command 
The special battalion, Yon Gab, consists oflndonesia's best 
troops: the army's red berets, the marines and the 
Paskhasau, the Air Force rangers. It is very rare for such 
special battalions to be prepared and assigned for a special 
mission. It is more than obvious that Cilangkap, the TNI 
headquarters, took a decision earlier this year to take swift 
action to eradicate extreme elements on both sides. 
Is it not ironic that key TNI officers who were involved in 
creating and fanning the conflict, are now engaged in swift 
actions to stop it? There are several answers to this conun-
drum, which are mutually reinforcing. Firstly, it is a fact of 
life that the TNI consists of different factions often with 
conflicting agendas. The inner TNI conflicts reached a 
climax in 1998 when Suharto was forced to step down. In 
the new era of civilian supremacy the military were forced 
to take a back seat. 
The hardliners 
The hard-line faction was wedded to a strategy of creating 
instability in the regions, to persuade a disenchanted public 
that the armed forces were the only force capable of guar-
anteeing stability. Creating instability in Maluku was 
primarily a military intelligence operation, similar to the 
operation in East Tim or from January till September 1999. 
Secondly, Maluku was fertile ground for such an operation 
with local conditions such as to make it easy to fan and 
exploit conflict. Local conflicts often have an economic 
background and so-called religious or ethnic conflicts are 
deliberately fanned because of conflicting economic inter-
ests, while the military have a big share in local economic 
interests. 
The more mainstream strands in the military were aware 
of the danger of fanning conflicts in the long term; they 
realised that, like the creator of Frankenstein, it is difficult 
to bring the beast back under control. This is the most likely 
reason why the prestigious Yon Gab was despatched to 
Maluku. In the meantime Maluku had been placed under a 
state of emergency, giving the military all the powers they 
needed to take heavy-handed measures. 
It is also acknowledged that key elements on both sides of 
the conflict are close to the military, or were created by the 
military or at the very least were given the green light by the 
military to keep the conflict going. The most blatant exam-
ple was the despatch of Laskar Jihad units from East Java to 
Maluku in mid 2000, despite strenuous efforts by the 
Jakarta government to prevent this. The military comman-
der of East Java Major General Sudi Silalahi did nothing 
whatever to prevent radical Muslim units from leaving by 
ship from Surabaya. 
The killing of Christian leader Agus Wattimena and key 
members of Laskar Jihad were a deliberate attempt on the 
part of TNI to eradicate all the evidence - dead men tell no 
tales, as they say. It is very cynical to note that TNI is now 
seen among some layers in public as the saviour ofMaluku. 
Investigation of the killings 
After a wave of protests by numerous Muslim organisa-
tions, the National Human Rights Commission decided to 
set up a fact-finding team to investigate the deadly attack on 
14 June. Earlier the TNI had decided to conduct their own 
investigation. A fact-finding team dispatched by the advo-
cacy team of Laskar Jihad discovered that the special forces 
had destroyed an entire medical clinic during the raid. The 
troops were apparently looking for a radio station: Suara 
Perjuangan Muslim Maluku (Voice of the Struggle of 
Muslim Malukans) and destroyed the studio. 
The operation by Yon Gab gives the impression that 
Cilangkap is serious about restoring law and order in 
Maluku. But experiences in Indonesian and elsewhere in the 
world show that prolonged conflicts cannot be resolved by 
a brutal law and order regime. The situation in Southeast 
Maluku where peace has been established has shown the 
way forward. Civil society, which includes all parties, has 
managed to find a peaceful way to reconciliation, using 
traditional as well as modern conflict resolution methods to 
restore society to normality. * 
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New forms of terror against workers 
There has been an upsurge of labour unrest in the past six months. With Indonesia's economic 
crisis still far from over, working conditions and wage rates have actually declined under President 
Wahid. Early moves to lift restrictions on the right to organise have not prevented strikers from 
confronting violence. Two workers were killed during a strike. A government U-turn on labour laws 
led to nationwide protests. 
The Wahid Government has been caught between wanting 
to improve better conditions for workers and pressure from 
business, both domestic and foreign, who squeal at any 
advancement for workers, even though in many industries, 
as little as 4 per cent of production costs go to paying their 
employees. With the economy in the doldrums, threats by 
foreign investors to withdraw from Indonesia because of the 
growing militancy among workers is likely to have a power-
ful impact on future developments. 
In 2000, a labour law was enacted which included provi-
sions to protect workers against losing severance pay, what-
ever the reason for losing their jobs. The law allowed for 
severance and service payment to all workers, regardless of 
why they were leaving their jobs. The business community 
lobbied hard for this provision to be withdrawn and won the 
day in March this year when the government announced the 
enactment of two decrees revoking these provisions. 
The government was clearly taken aback by the strength of 
resistance to the U-turn. These days however, millions of 
workers have taken advantage of the ending of restrictions on 
union organisation and new unions have sprung up like wild-
fire. At the latest count, there are around 35 trade union 
federations, more than a hundred non-affiliated unions in 
various industries and an estimated 11,000 company-based 
unions, while tens of thousands of workers have gained expe-
rience in organising themselves democratically and learning 
about their rights, including the right not to be sacked for 
taking strike action. Most observers agree that the fastest-
growing federation is the FNPBI, the National Front for 
Indonesian Workers' Struggle, led by one of Indonesia's most 
experienced trade union leaders, Dita Indah Sari. 
The new decrees were seen as an infringement of the right 
to legal trade union and protest activity. 'The issue is one of 
job security and workers' fundamental rights,' said Maulana, 
a garment factory worker who took part in a rally against 
the decrees outside the president's palace. With economic 
conditions still so uncertain, workers wish to ensure that 
they receive proper compensation for their years of service 
in case they lose their jobs for any reason. [Inter-Press 
Service, 25 June 2001] 
The protests reached a climax on 13 June when thousands 
of workers demonstrated in Jakarta, in several West Java 
cities, in Medan, North Sumatra, and in Surabaya, East 
Java. In Sidoarjo, East Java, troops fired warning shots to 
disperse thousands of workers attempting to break through 
a security barricade set up to prevent them from reaching 
Surabaya. In Bandung, West Java, the protest demonstra-
tions continued for three days. [AFP, 13 June 2001] 
Provocateurs at work? 
While thousands of workers from the environs of Bandung 
were demonstrating in the provincial capital on 13 June, the 
action suddenly turned violent, resulting in widespread 
damage to property. The local police then alleged that 
'outsiders' were responsible and arrested 21 people, of 
whom six were members of the People's Democracy Party, 
PRD, and the remainder were workers. Dita Indah Sari of 
the FNPBI, later accused GOLKAR and PDI-P (Megawati's 
party) elements within the union movement of starting the 
violence in order to discredit President Wahid who was 
facing possible impeachment. [Jakarta Post, 18 June] 
A few days later, the Bandung office of the lawyers organ-
isation, PBHI, which was representing the 21 'suspects' 
being held by the police was raided by a gang of thugs 
claiming to be members of the Siliwangi Youth Generation, 
an organisation closely associated with the local military. 
Here was a case of a legitimate workers' action being 
derailed, while giving the police grounds to swoop down on 
members of the PRD, a party already branded as 'dangerous' 
by the national chief of police, Bimantoro. If, as is expected, 
Wahid is replaced by Vice-President Megawati, moves against 
workers and left-wing organisations could turn very ugly. 
Confronted by such widespread opposition, the Wahid 
government decided to delay implementation of the two 
controversial decrees. Most trade unions saw this not as a 
victory but as a move to put the issue on ice and will 
continue to press for the decrees to be revoked. 
Two strikers killed in unprovoked attack 
Hundreds of workers who were conducting a strike against 
a car upholstery factory were suddenly attack by a gang of 
hoodlums armed with sharp weapons, swords and home-
made bombs. One of the workers, Kimun Effendi (21) died 
from shrapnel wounds when an explosive device went off. 
Another, Rachmat Hidayat (22) died in hospital a few days 
later. Ten others were injured during the attack. 
The attack by a gang of no fewer than 500 people occurred 
in the middle of the night on 29 March when the strikers 
were all asleep on the factory premises where they had been 
carrying out their action for ten days. One of the strikers 
told the press: 'They brandished their machetes and samurai 
swords and their screaming woke us up. They ordered us to 
leave the factory and halt the strike. We resisted their attack 
by hosing them with water but before leaving, the attackers 
threw an explosive at us.' [Jakarta Post, 20 March 2001] 
The attack occurred a few days after negotiations with the 
company management had ended in deadlock. The strike 
against the Japanese-owned company was over a demand for a 
100 per cent increase in salaries (later reduced to 75 per cent). 
An employee of the company who came forward as a 
witness (asking that his name not be divulged) said that he 
saw an army truck with about 30 men on board, parked 
nearby at the time of the attack. 'The troops did nothing to 
halt the attack even though they witnessed what happen at 
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the factory.' 
Workers later said they would continue the strike despite the 
attack. One said: 'I have been working for the company for 
nine years but I only receive Rps 374,000 ($3 7.40) a month 
and a Rp 4,000 transportation allowance a day.' (The minimum 
wage for Jakarta was officially fixed at Rp 426.000 a month, 
starting on l February 2001.) They are also demanding that 
two suspended colleagues be re-instated, that workers who 
have worked for the company for more than 18 months should 
be given permanent status and that the company's vice-direc-
tor should be dismissed. Muchtar Pakpahan of the Indonesian 
Prosperous Labour Union, SBSI, warned that collusion 
between businesspeople, security personnel and hoodlums had 
now become the fashion in putting down strikes. [Jakarta 
Post, 3 I March and 2 April, 200 I] 
Army-hoodlum link 
Police investigations into the deadly attack say they have 
discovered a link between an army officer, a member of the 
local assembly and the deputy general manager of the 
company, Amrin Gobel who is a retired military officer. The 
investigating officer said when he visited the home of the 
assembly member; the house was filled with scores of 
hoodlums who were 'holding some kind of meeting'. The 
unnamed police officer said the assembly member was 
known to be paying for martial arts training for hoodlums. 
He said he could not possibly have made any arrests as his 
men wern outnumbered. [Jakarta Post, 7 April 2001] 
Widespread abuse in Nike factories 
An investigation conducted by the Global Alliance for 
Workers and Communities in nine factories in Indonesia 
that produce footwear for Nike reported that sexual and 
verbal harassment, limited access to medical care and 
compulsory overtime are commonplace in these factories. 
The investigators conducted one-hour interviews with no 
fewer than 4,400 people, mostly women. The investigation 
had been commissioned and funded by Nike. A spokesper-
son for the company described the alarming findings of the 
investigations as 'troubling', while admitting that the nine 
factories covered by the survey were among the most 
progressive in the country. Its vice-president for corporate 
responsibility, Dusty Kidd, said: 'No worker should be 
subject to some of the conditions reported in this assess-
ment', and promised that the company would start a 'serious 
and reasonable remediable plan'. 
The report documented two deaths in separate factories 
which workers said were related to denial of medical atten-
tion. Almost half those questioned said medical facilities 
were inadequate, while some said supervisors only allowed 
them to visit a clinic after they had collapsed. One woman 
said a supervisor threw a book at her for being too slow 
while others said they were forced to run round the factory 
or clean toilets if they worked to slowly. 
Labour activists said there were many other problems not 
raised in the report. 'Freedom of association and the mini-
mum wage are two other big issues we are campaigning on,' 
said Rudi Hartono, head of the Association of Shoe Factory 
Workers. He said wages would have to rise 75 per cent to 
cover basic needs. 'Is that such a hardship considering that 
the cost of making a pair of shoes, including the labour, is 
only about 0.4 per cent of what it is sold for in the shops?' 
[The Guardian, 23 February 2001] 
Critics of Nike, while commending the company's recent 
conversion to greater transparency about conditions were 
worried that the workers have no tools to hold Nike account-
able for its promises to improve. 'Global Alliance can't do 
anything ecause they are not a monitoring organisation,' said 
Barna Athreya, deputy director of the International Labor 
Rights Fund. Why not invite local NGOstrained in monitor-
ing to come in and do a code of conduct investigation?' {Asia 
Wall Street Journal, 21 February 2001] 
Woman worker speaks her mind 
A labour activist who was arrested and put on trial for her 
role in organising a strike at a factory that produces shoes 
for Adidas has accused the government of failing to protect 
workers' rights and defending the interests of business. 
Ngadinah, 29, was arrested on 23 April and charged with 
'inciting people to resist public authority' and for 'unpleasant 
conduct' towards 'other people', meaning towards the factory 
managers. She is general secretary of the trade union at the 
shoe factory. She was arrested after the company for whom 
she worked, PT Panarub complained to the police that she 
had 'masterminded' a four-day strike by 8,000 workers in 
September last year. After being held in jail for a month, she 
was released while her trial was still in progress, following 
the intervention of the minister for the environment, Sony 
Keraf and officials of the Legal Aid Foundation and the 
Commission for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence. 
Speaking at the office of her union, the Federation of 
Independent Trade Unions (GSBI), she said that practices 
which prevailed under the Suharto regime have still 
persisted in the era of reform. 'The government's failure to 
ensure the rights of laborers to live a proper life is a form of 
crimes against humanity.' She also spoke of the practice of 
the bosses to hire hoodlums to torture workers.' She 
condemned the collusion between the company's execu-
tives,, the prosecutor's office, the police and the government 
labour office in Tangerang where the company is located. 
She was due to testify at the annual meeting of the 
International Labour Organisation in Geneva about the 
violation of workers' rights by the Indonesian government. 
[Jakarta Post, 25 May] 
Top Jakarta hotel closed for months 
Hundreds of workers at one of Jakarta's top-quality hotel, 
the Shangri-La went on strike two days before Christmas 
Eve, forcing the hotel to close for more than three months. 
The hotel is owned by a Malaysian tycoon, Robert Kuok 
who has a variety of business interests in Indonesia. 
The strike began in protest at the suspension of a worker for 
allegedly inciting his fellow workers to come out on strike. 
The workers were calling for improvements in working 
conditions and an equal share-out of service charges and the 
establishment of a pension fund. In a hotel where rooms cost 
$95 a night, the workers earn at the most $35 a month. It is 
one of the most sought-after locations for high-class wedding 
receptions. Shots of a wedding reception at the Shangri-La 
costing $120.000, taken just days before the strike broke out, 
were used in a new film by John Pilger, The New Rulers of 
the World, shown on British television on 18 July. 
Instead of complying with the workers demands, the 
management sacked the leaders and members of the union. 
International solidarity 
Their union, the Shangri-La Independent Workers' Union 
continued on page J 0 
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20 kms east of Lhokseumawe, North Aceh. A young 
woman, Zubaidad, 25, told him troops had burst into her 
house, demanding to know where her husband was. He was 
not at home, she told them, clutching her four-month baby 
boy. They snatched the baby from her, threw him on the 
ground outside and poured boiling water over him. Warned 
that if they left their hut, they would be killed, neither she 
nor her 15-year old sister dared to go outside to rescue the 
baby 'as the soldiers went on a killing, looting and burning 
spree through the village' . By the time the troops had left, it 
was too late to save the scolded baby who died next morn-
ing and lies buried in a shallow grave marked by a stone. 
The village that was home to 385 villagers had been 
devastated by an attack 6 May. All the houses were burnt or 
trashed.The journalist, Lindsay Murdoch, no stranger to the 
murderous behaviour of Indonesian troops on his country's 
doorstep in East Timar, wrote: 'The arrival of hundreds of 
fresh troops in Aceh has seen the military unleash a wave of 
largely unreported violence that in some areas is worse than 
the 1999 atrocities in East Timar. [The Age and Sydney 
Morning Herald, 14 May 2001] 
Later that month, a Norwegian journalist, Torgeir Norling, 
thought he would follow up this account with an investiga-
tion of his own in North Aceh. When he arrived, with two 
Acehnese activists in Peudada, they were ordered off the 
bus, held at the local police station for 24 hours and then 
told to leave the area, 'because they had no official docu-
ments' . Norling reports widely for Scandinavian and East 
Asia newspapers. [The Nation - Bangkok, 27 May 2001] 
According to Dini Djalal, writing in the Far Eastern 
Economic Review [5 July], Acehnese journalists are 
routinely threatened and beaten by the police. 'Yarmen 
Dinamika, of the local newspaper Serambi, says his office 
was bombed twice and seven office cars set ablaze in the 
last two years.' Commenting on army press releases that 
routinely identify civilians killed in crossfire, even children 
and the elderly, as 'GAM members', Dinamika said: 'In a 
conflict like this, the first victim is the truth.' 
NGOs forced to leave 
Under intense pressure and facing constant threats or 
worse, many local activists have left Aceh for the relative 
safety of Jakarta or gone abroad. The International Crisis 
Group, in a special report on Aceh published in June, 
quoted a witness to the killing of three volunteers of the 
torture NGO, RATA, as saying that the killings were the 
work of intelligence operatives who told their victims: 
'Anyone who works for an NGO is GAM.' Another rights 
activist was warned that the military only trusts half a dozen 
out of the 300 NGOs in Aceh.[Far Eastern Economic 
Review, 5 July 2001] 
On 26 June, the head office in Banda Aceh of an NGO 
devoted to protecting the interests of children, Yayasan Anak 
Bangsa, was raided in the night by heavily-armed members 
of the special police unit, Brimob, some of whom were wear-
ing black T-shirts. A man guarding the premises was forced 
to open up all the rooms and watched helpless as the intrud-
ers ransacked cupboards and confiscated diskettes. They 
refused to believe that YAB focuses on the plight of children 
and wanted to know whether it was linked to the Henri 
Dunant Centre (which oversees the peace talks). 
Three days earlier, the Banda Aceh office the Legal Aid 
ACEH 
Institute (LBH) was raided by unidentified men who 
destroyed a notice board on which were displayed photos of 
people who have been kidnapped by the security forces . 
[Tempo Interaktif27 June 2001] 
International presence crucial 
It is widely acknowledged that international observers 
and the permanent presence of international humanitarian 
agenciesare crucially important to overcome Aceh 's isola-
tion, to provide protection to human rights activists and to 
the population at large. But the intensity of military opera-
tions is causing some agencies to leave. 
The decision by two UN agencies, the UNDP amd 
UNICEF, to leave Aceh is a serious setback because the 
presence of UN agencies is so critically important for Aceh. 
The UNDP says it decided to leave because the situation 
was 'not conducive ', following the collapse of the 
Humanitarian Pause agreement. OXFAM has an office in 
Lhokseumawe but conditions in North Aceh are too danger-
ous for it to venture beyond the city. A Peace Brigades 
International team of volunteers give what protection they 
can in several cities to targeted NGOs and activists. 
In a letter to the British government in July, TAPOL called 
for UN monitors to visit Aceh, in particular the Special 
Rapporteurs on Extrajudicial, Arbitrary and Summary 
Excutions and on Torture, and the Special Representative on 
Human Rights Defenders. 
Strong warning from Australia 
In July, the Australian foreign minister Alexander Downer 
issued a strong warning to the Indonesian military not to 
commit the kind of human rights abuses that were seen in 
East Timar in the past, in West Papua and Aceh, because this 
could lead to outrage by the international comunity. 
Launching a government publication about East Timar, he 
said he was concerned over reports from Aceh that pro-
Indonesian militias were being formed. 'If the TNI go down 
that path, they will be making an enormous mistake', 
hesaid. [AP, 17 July 2001] * 
continued from back page 
proportions. In his efforts to accommodate his political 
foes, the former president agreed to issue a presidential 
instruction in April which provided the armed forces with 
a 'legal umbrella' to conduct military operations, ending 
all hope of a peaceful solution there. Numerous acts of 
provocation, widespread arrests and kidnaps by the armed 
forces in West Papua have led human rights activists there 
to warn that West Papua could soon become a 'second 
Aceh'. Regional conflicts continue unabated and there are 
now more than a million internally-displaced people in 
Indonesia. 
The commitment of Indonesia's new president to reform 
remains to be seen. Her close ties with the military do not 
augur well for the upholding of human rights, for a peace-
ful solution to the conflicts in West Papua and Aceh and 
for the restoration of the rule of law. Far from being able 
to take such an agenda forward, she may soon find herself 
mired in the same snake-pit of political intrigue that 
brought her predecessor down. The struggle for human 
rights in Indonesia is likely to become even more difficult 
in the months and years to come. * 
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The prospects for human rights in Indonesia 
The installation of Megawati Sukarnoputri as president of Indonesia confronts civil society and the 
human rights community in Indonesia with new challenges, after two wasted years under the pres-
idency of Abdurrahman Wahid. 
Whatever his intentions when he accepted his election as 
president in October 1999, Wahid soon proved incapable of 
achieving anything in advancing the programme of refor-
masi that was supposed to be the hallmark of his govern-
ment. This was because the forces rallied against him, the 
well-entrenched 'New Order' elements as well as the armed 
forces, were determined to sabotage such efforts. 
A creeping coup d'etat 
For months before he was deposed, activists were warning 
that the encirclement tactics used against him were shaping 
up into a coup d'etat. The former president was effective 
only during his first few months in office when he sacked 
senior army officers, most notably General Wiranto, the 
TNI commander-in-chief who was responsible for the 
disastrous events in September 1999 in East Timor. By the 
middle of 2000, it was evident that Wahid was losing the 
political battle against the old forces. As the offensive 
against him escalated, his own erratic handling of the crisis 
damaged his reputation as someone who was able to run the 
country and resulted in a yawning vacuum at the heart of 
government. 
Reformasi virtually became a dead letter and all efforts to 
bring the men responsible for past violations of human 
rights and crimes against humanity were frustrated by the 
legislature and by the executive's failure to overhaul the 
judiciary, in particular the judges and the public prosecutors 
office. Although the armed forces only occupies 38 seats in 
the People's Assembly, they were able to block any serious 
reform measures. 
The former president became the target of a virulent hate 
campaign in the free press - one of the most important 
achievements of the post-Suharto era. This reflects the fact 
that most of the print media is owned by former Suharto 
cronies who know that substantial reform measures will 
jeopardise their vested interests. Not only was Wahid 
portrayed as being incompetent and corrupt but also as the 
root cause of the country's economic and political crisis. 
The role of the military 
The military had their own grievances against the Wahid 
government. Discredited by decades of human rights viola-
tions and licking their wounds over their defeat in East 
Timor, they reluctantly agreed to take a back seat in politi-
cal and economic affairs, and began to speak as if reform 
of the armed forces and the end of their dwifungsi role was 
on their agenda. But by the beginning of 2001, they had 
been able so effectively to consolidate themselves internally 
that they were in a position to strike back. When he tried to 
reshuffle the TNI leadership, they began to defy his orders, 
rather timidly at first but by May, they were engaged in open 
mutiny against their supreme commander. The main conflict 
was how to handle the opposition forces in Aceh and West 
Papua where the pressure for self-determination is strong, 
and the need to end impunity. 
While many human rights activists and NGOs did what 
they could to support the flagging efforts of the president, 
they too were unable to turn back the tide unleashed against 
him and were forced to stand by helplessly as he was uncer-
emoniously dumped by forces whose commitment to refor-
mas1 1s zero. 
Deteriorating human rights 
There has been a marked deterioration in the human rights 
situation in the past year. Scores of people are now being 
held as political prisoners in various parts of the country. 
Far from repealing articles in the Criminal Code that crimi-
nalise legitimate political activities, 'hate-sowing' crimes 
and accusations of rebellion are again being used in the 
courts of law. 
The level of killings in Aceh has reached monstrous 
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